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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) remains committed to working 
seamlessly with its international, federal, state and local partners to counter terrorism, the 
number one priority of the FBI. In order to more effectively equip personnel to meet and 
counter the ever-evolving threat, it is critical that inefficient practices that cause 
counterterrorism practitioners to “recreate the wheel” are quickly transformed to promote 
the most efficient counterterrorism knowledge management, knowledge transfer, and 
training practices available. Lessons learned through both formalized training and on-the-
job experience must be quickly leveraged to aid broader sectors of the FBI and partner 
communities in order to promote streamlined operations in combating terrorism while 
countering inefficient knowledge management. This research identifies and analyzes the 
knowledge management deficit in counterterrorism training, while examining the core 
influences of organizational mindset and individual mindsets, the importance of trust, and 
the misnomer of ‘best practices’ that must be acknowledged and overcome. Focused on 
the establishment of Counterterrorism Mobile Education Teams to drive the enhanced 
infusion of tacit counterterrorism knowledge, this research culminates in the delineation 
of a multi-faceted strategy comprised of recommendations to target remaining 
counterterrorism training gaps, to strengthen homeland security collaboration, and to 
combat terrorism. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In its 100-year history, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has developed a 
strong reputation as one of the finest law enforcement agencies in the world. One critical 
component of this reputation emanates from the agency’s ability to conduct large-scale 
investigations, evidence recovery, forensic analysis and extensive liaison in order to 
successfully investigate, locate and prosecute some of the world’s most heinous criminals 
and national security offenders. Another critical component of this reputation is the 
extensive partnership of the FBI with foreign, federal, state, local, and tribal entities to 
fight transnational crime. The third component stems from the ability of the FBI to adapt 
to as well as counter emerging threats. As the FBI continues to address its number one 
priority of counterterrorism against a wide range of enemies who train daily to bring 
catastrophic harm to the United States, our citizens, and our interests, it is critical that 
internal FBI processes are streamlined to ensure not only the most proactive use of finite 
resources, but also the most efficient use these resources. Since the inception of the FBI, 
one of its most valuable resources has been its personnel who possess vast skill sets, 
honed areas of expertise, and an unwavering commitment to ensure justice.  
Within the counterterrorism arena, the FBI remains committed to investigating 
domestic and international terrorism in order to protect our Nation and our interests. With 
the significant expansion of FBI personnel overseas, largely in the past two decades, the 
FBI has maximized partnerships with foreign and domestic agencies while expanding the 
breadth of proactive counterterrorism investigations occurring at the intersection of law 
enforcement, intelligence and military capabilities. Considering the wide range of 
counterterrorism (CT) training expertise developed by FBI personnel throughout the 
world, it is critical that the FBI better utilize this expertise to prepare more adequately a 
larger percentage of its workforce and its interagency partners to address the CT threat. In 
essence, the FBI must improve its knowledge management mechanisms to enhance the 




personnel. Partly in response to recommendations emanating from the National 
Commission on Terrorist Acts upon the United States, the FBI created and implemented a 
formalized Special Agent Career Path, one of which is the Counterterrorism Career Path.  
This thesis is founded in the theory that the FBI CT Career Path remains in its 
infancy; a template primed for enhancement. Of glaring importance is the fact that the 
FBI CT Career Path currently fails to capitalize upon the expertise of its most 
experienced agents and to spread this expertise to a larger portion of the agency. Three 
critical courses of action would significantly enhance the CT Career Path: a major 
overhaul of the agent mentoring system; the development of Mobile Education Teams to 
provide a forum for the most experienced CT agents and analysts to share their expertise 
with less seasoned personnel; and the development of a robust Web-based forum such as 
a Center for Lessons Learned. While several versions of the aforementioned courses of 
action have been considered and/or implemented, substantial room for improvement 
remains. This thesis acknowledges the fact that effective knowledge transfer is very 
difficult, if not impossible, by personnel who are constantly deployed away from home or 
fully assigned with CT duties. Effective knowledge transfer is also plagued by the fact 
that the FBI remains an organization where success is more readily measured by 
statistical accomplishments such as arrests and convictions rather than by holistic 
methods to more effectively understand and address the threat by streamlining knowledge 
transfer and reducing inefficiency that results from “recreating the wheel.” 
As evidenced by the outcomes of numerous inquiries and public opinion polls 
since 9/11, the American public expects the FBI to execute effectively its duties as a dual 
counterterrorism and domestic intelligence agency. Since 9/11, the FBI has taken 
significant steps to counter the threat, to include the reassignment of hundreds of 
personnel to CT matters; the vast expansion of overseas offices and interagency 
partnerships; hiring drives to employ personnel with critical skills; revisions to training 
curricula, to include the implementation of several Web-based/self-paced options; the 
establishment the Strategic Execution Team (SET) to examine, improve, and address 
several gaps; and marked improvements in the FBI Intranet and other technology 
availability to improve communications. In the realm of CT training, however, the FBI 
 xv
has been only partially successful in providing necessary training to CT personnel. Due to 
its position as the lead CT agency and partner homeland security agency, it is critical that 
the FBI continue to adequately train FBI and liaison personnel with the necessary 
resources to accomplish the mission.  
Eighteen recommendations and implementation suggestions are proposed within 
this thesis, aimed at enhancing the infusion of counterterrorism expertise in order to 
target remaining counterterrorism training gaps, to strengthen homeland security 
collaboration, and to maximize success in combating terrorism, as follows: 
• Provide renewed emphasis on training while countering the negative 
mindset that exists toward training; 
• Enhance administrative support for counterterrorism personnel so that a 
significant portion of their time is not usurped by non-related 
administrative duties; 
• Drive people out of their comfort zones by emphasizing the importance of 
each and every employee sharing their knowledge and expertise in order 
to not only streamline efforts, but also to ensure that the FBI continues to 
grow into a true and dynamic ‘learning organization’; 
• Develop and disseminate the ‘story’ that great change has been 
accomplished and continues for the right reasons; 
• Capitalize on the most viable ready reserve of highly trained CT 
personnel, specifically the Fly Team, and facilitate their transfer to 
numerous Field Offices throughout the FBI upon completion of three 
years or more of service to the CTD Fly Team; 
• Develop an Expert Registry–this registry should include up-to-date 
information regarding the comprehensive experience of personnel, to 
include investigations worked, specialized skills, as well as travel and 
training completed; 
• Develop a comprehensive CT Training and Tracking System–this system 
would be an important enhancement to the Expert Registry in that it would 
identify the training of CT personnel, existing gaps and needs for 
refresher/recertification training, etc.   
• Implement a CT Readiness Index–This project has been led and directed 
by Associate Executive Assistant Director T.J. Harrington as part of a 
measurement framework for the CT Career Path. The implementation of 
this index, in combination with an Expert Registry and an overall 




CT personnel, will provide the strategic framework to truly delineate the 
strengths and weaknesses of personnel, while providing a baseline of 
measurement for continued change; 
• Revise the Training Agent/Mentoring program; 
• Utilize the Field Office Training Coordinator Program as a mechanism to 
promote an enhanced Training Agent/Mentoring program, as well as a 
forum for promoting the use of Mobile Education Teams regionally; 
• Establish quarterly CT training that is interactive in nature and not solely 
Web-based; 
• Create a robust Web-based Center for Lessons Learned; 
• Spread expertise to Field Offices through the development of CT Mobile 
Education Teams comprised of personnel who have completed 
assignments to the Fly Team, Extraterritorial Squads, Office of 
International Operations/Legal Attaches, etc.; 
• Spread organizational understanding of and, where possible, link the 
strategic mission, messages, services and products of such entities as 
CEPDU, SET and METs, as well as the Special Agent Advisory 
Committee, Counterterrorism Division Assistant Director’s Advisory 
Committee, etc.;  
• Link training received and shared to performance appraisals; 
• Develop a mechanism to review, assess and, where appropriate, 
implement strategic recommendations that emanate from the studies of 
personnel in advanced degree programs; 
• Create a unit within the Counterterrorism Division to develop and guide 
the implementation of the Mobile Education Teams and to assist in the 
development of the other proposed recommendations in concert with the 
Continuing Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU); 
• Ensure utilization principles authored by Steven Kelman regarding 
change, particularly by leveraging personnel that are ideologically 
discontent with the traditional system, exposing them to early wins from 
the development/implementation of knowledge transfer mechanisms, and 





Historically, the FBI has risen to meet evolving challenges, most recently by 
further developing itself as a dual law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency. By 
transforming CT training and enhancing knowledge transfer mechanisms as 
recommended in this thesis, the FBI would not only enhance continued efforts to achieve 
its critical, dual mission, but also maximize preparedness to counter the threat 
successfully. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In its 100-year history, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has developed a 
strong reputation as one of the finest law enforcement agencies in the world. One critical 
component of this reputation emanates from the agency’s ability to conduct large-scale 
investigations, evidence recovery, forensic analysis and extensive liaison in order to 
successfully investigate, locate and prosecute some of the world’s most heinous criminals 
and national security offenders. Another critical component of this reputation is the 
extensive partnership of the FBI with foreign, federal, state and local entities to fight 
transnational crime. The third component stems from the ability of the FBI to adapt to 
emerging threats. 
Change: it’s been a staple at the FBI since its very beginning. Over the 
decades, we’ve continued to adapt and build new capabilities to deal with 
wave after wave of emerging threats–the violent gangsters of the ‘20s and 
‘30s. . .the Axis agents of World War II. . .the mobsters of the 1950s and 
beyond. . . the Soviet Spies of the Cold War. . .the financial and corporate 
hucksters of the rising global economy. . .and more recently, domestic and 
international terrorists.1 
Training is a core element in the foundation of FBI success. The FBI has a long 
tradition of providing exceptional training to its law enforcement partners through a 
variety of highly regarded courses offered at both the FBI Academy in Quantico, 
Virginia, and at several locations overseas. Similarly, the rigorous 21-week training 
program required to become a sworn Special Agent of the FBI is another respected 
curriculum. With the ever-increasing advent of the terrorist threat throughout the past 
decades, however, the FBI has been unable, to date, to adjust procedures to provide 
adequate counterterrorism (CT) training to the majority of its personnel. For many years, 
despite the inadequacies in formal CT training, fundamental law enforcement training 
and on-the-job experience have allowed a small percentage of the Special Agent 
                                                 
1 “Training,” www.fbi.gov/aboutus/transformation/training.htm. 
 2
population assigned to CT matters to successfully conduct numerous high-profile, 
complex CT investigations worldwide, yet the stakes were clearly elevated by the 
terrorists on 9/11/2001.  
Partly in response to recommendations emanating from the National Commission 
on Terrorist Acts upon the United States, the FBI created and implemented a formalized 
career path for Special Agents. This career path includes the assignment of Special 
Agents to Intelligence, Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Cyber, Criminal or 
Science/Technology tracks.2 Still in its developmental stages, the career path is structured 
to allow agents to obtain a specialty designation in one of the six designations upon 
completion of specialized training and on-the-job experience during a five-year period.  
The Counterterrorism (CT) Career Path is the foundation of what currently exists 
as a draft of the Counterterrorism Developmental Plan, comprised of four stages as 
follows:3 
• Stage I: New Agent Training 
• Stage II: Post-New Agent Training to Three Years 
• Stage III: Three to Five Years 
• Stage IV: Five Plus Years 
Each stage of the draft plan involves on-the-job experiences, Web-based and 
classroom-based training, and core competency training. A second component of the 
Counterterrorism Career Path may evolve from what currently exists in draft format as a 
Counterterrorism Readiness Index. This index is a proficiency scale based on points 
gathered to place an agent in the red, yellow, or green stages of proficiency. Another 
component within the development of the CT Career Path included the September 2007 
implementation of a six-week specialized Basic Counterterrorism curriculum beyond the 
CT training received by New Agent Trainees at Quantico for agents recently designated 
to the CT Career Path. At present, however, neither the component elements of the four 
                                                 
2 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Responds to Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Acts upon the United States, Press Release (Washington, D.C.: FBI, July 22, 2004), 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel04/pressrel072204.htm. 
3 FBI Science and Technology Division, Draft Career Path (Washington, D.C.: FBI, 2007). 
 3
stage CT Developmental Plan nor the CT Readiness Index address methods to preserve 
institutional memory or to infuse the expertise of its experienced personnel in Stage IV to 
its personnel in lower stages.      
Since the number one priority of the FBI is counterterrorism, to include the 
prevention of terrorist attacks, it is critical that gaps in knowledge transfer and training 
are quickly addressed in order to more effectively equip personnel to meet and counter 
the threat. Ignoring these gaps has the potential to cause very negative implications in the 
realm of U.S. homeland security. As terrorists continue to train daily to bring catastrophic 
harm to United States citizens and interests worldwide, the FBI can no longer afford to be 
plagued by “recreating the wheel.” Lessons learned through both formalized training and 
on-the-job experience must be quickly leveraged to aid broader sectors of the FBI and 
partner communities in order to promote streamlined operations in combating terrorism 
while countering inefficient knowledge management. Failing to achieve this goal makes 
the FBI and interagency homeland security efforts less effective. As a result, the FBI 
must devise and implement a strategic plan to enhance and maximize the CT training 
available to its personnel by leveraging knowledge gained in the field, sharing it with 
additional personnel, and simultaneously enhancing core capacities.   
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Considering the wide range of CT expertise developed by FBI personnel 
throughout the world, how does the FBI better utilize this expertise to prepare more 
adequately a larger percentage of its workforce and its interagency partners to address the 
threat? How may the FBI employ knowledge management to infuse critical knowledge 
from its experienced personnel to its less experienced personnel?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While substantial literature exists concerning preservation of institutional 
memory, knowledge acquisition, and knowledge management, it is applicable only 
indirectly in the homeland security arena, particularly about the entrenched tactics, 
techniques and procedures of the FBI. As a result, it is evident that a review and synthesis 
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of this broad literature is critical in building a newfound template that is directly 
applicable to homeland security efforts, particularly within the FBI counterterrorism 
arena.  
1. Literature on Maximizing and Preserving Institutional Memory 
Maximizing or institutionalizing expertise within the field of homeland security 
remains an exception rather than the rule. Since lessons learned are often not adequately 
institutionalized, agencies confront the same issues on a recurrent basis. As delineated by 
John Coffey and Robert Hoffman in the Journal of Knowledge Management in 2003, 
“Institutional memory loss is a significant problem that can impact an organization’s 
ability to advance its mission successfully, its ability to avoid making the same mistakes 
it made in the past, and its ability to leverage the accomplishments of departing 
employees.”4 As revealed in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, it is vital 
that the U.S. government “lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we 
need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.”5 The 
FBI recognized the critical nature of capitalizing upon the skills of its personnel in the 
FBI Strategic Plan 2004–2009 as follows: “Breaking needs down to their most basic 
elements, the key competitive difference in the 21st Century will be people. It will not be 
process. It will not be technology. It will be people.”6   
While the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism champions the need to 
foster intellectual and human capital, it focuses on the development of a pool of 
counterterrorism experts without delineating the need for preserving institutional 
memory.7 Similarly, the FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009 recognizes the need to establish a 
                                                 
4 John W. Coffey and Robert R. Hoffman, “Knowledge Modeling for the Preservation of Institutional 
Memory,” Journal of Knowledge Management, 7 no. 3, (2003): 1, 
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Publiched/Emerald.html. 
5 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006), 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/nsct2006.pdf. 
6 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009 (Washington, D.C.: FBI, 2003), n.p. 
http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/strategicplantext.htm. 
7 President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 21. 
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‘preeminent workforce’ through human capital capability,8 yet excludes mention of the 
institutional memory component that is critical in ensuring this reality. To date, the most 
relevant source uncovered concerning the need for institutionalizing counterterrorism 
knowledge within the FBI emanates from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG). OIG recommended that the FBI “issue a policy on and develop 
a system for capturing and disseminating lessons learned from counterterrorism incidents, 
operations, and exercises.”9 An October 1, 2002 Press Release by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in response to the OIG report indicated that the FBI would accomplish the 
following: 1) institute a case review system to learn from past investigations; and 2) 
establish a working group, chaired by the Deputy Assistant Director from the Criminal 
Investigative Division, to implement this system and analyze lessons learned. 
Considering the fact that the case review system and working group results are not fully 
available to the organization within the CT realm, there is continued room for 
improvement.  
As the FBI examines available avenues to expand institutional memory, it is clear 
that several factors must be overcome to ensure success. One of the most daunting 
barriers to the implementation of knowledge acquisition techniques involves the reality 
that, “knowledge acquisition methods can consume large amounts of time of busy 
experts, and take them away from their main tasks. It is difficult to convince time-pressed 
employees to record information in an ongoing fashion, which mediates against the 
approaches that require ongoing collection of information.”10 Taking this one step 
further, such change mandates a shift in the culture and mindset of FBI counterterrorism 
personnel. “FBI agents and managers have long measured their success on arrests,  
 
 
                                                 
8 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan, n. p. 
9 Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterterrorism 
Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management, Report No. 02-38, Executive 
Summary Redacted and Unclassified (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002), 8, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/fbi02.sum.html. 
10 Coffrey and Hoffman, “Knowledge Modeling,” 2. 
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prosecutions, and convictions, standard benchmarks for law enforcement investigative 
activities. These traditional measures are largely irrelevant to the prevention mission in 
terrorism.”11   
2. Literature on Knowledge Management 
Homeland security knowledge management was examined by Deidre Walker in 
2005 in a thesis entitled, Homeland Security Knowledge Management for Local Law 
Enforcement in the National Capital Region.” While this template provides important 
insight into homeland security knowledge management, it does not specifically relate to 
the preservation of institutional memory as it relates to CT matters. Relating knowledge 
management techniques, specifically the preservation of institutional memory, to 
counterterrorism knowledge will require substantial innovation and flexibility. In reality, 
CT knowledge is very difficult to quantify: it often emanates from unique experiences 
that cannot be separated from the psychology and unpredictable nature of human 
behavior.  
David J. Snowden, founder of the Cynefin Center, whose studies reveal several 
techniques for knowledge management, has authored extensive literature on knowledge 
management. In his article titled, “Managing for Serendipity or Why We Should Lay Off 
‘Best Practice’ in KM,” he delineates how best practice techniques may not be best suited 
for knowledge management because they are not forward leaning in promoting enhanced 
decision making or in creating environments for innovation.12 The utilization of “best 
practices” has become a commonly discussed and more regularly implemented tool in the 
realm of homeland security, particularly within the FBI. When the research of Snowden, 
however, is extrapolated to the FBI, it sheds new light on the fact that tools other than 
“best practices,” may be more effective vehicles for enhancing knowledge management 
within the FBI.   
                                                 
11 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Strategic Plan, n.p.  
12 David J. Snowden, “Managing for Serendipity or Why We Should Lay Off ‘Best Practice’ in KM,” 
http://www.cognitive-edge.com/ceresources/articles/39_Managing_for_Serendipity_final.pdf. 
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As delineated above, substantial literature exists in the realms of maximizing and 
preserving institutional memory, as well as knowledge management, yet the application 
of this literature within the homeland security arena remains largely new and 
unsubstantiated. Synthesizing this literature as it relates to homeland security CT efforts 
within the FBI, to identify and address existing gaps, will result in the creation of an 
innovative model for infusing CT knowledge from experienced to newer personnel to 
maximize FBI and partner preparedness to effectively counter the threat.  
D. ARGUMENT 
As evidenced by the significantly larger number of agents working CT matters, 
the increase in the number of interagency Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) throughout 
the country, the dramatic rise in the number of FBI Legal Attaché offices overseas, and 
the initiation of a targeted, CT Career Path for Special Agents, the FBI has undergone 
momentous change since 9/11 to better prepare to meet the threats and to address the 
primary counterterrorism mission of the FBI. With the human resources in place, 
however, now the FBI must adapt its training procedures and mold its CT Career Path to 
better equip these counterterrorism personnel.  
This thesis is founded in the theory that the FBI CT Career Path remains in its 
infancy; a template primed for enhancement. Of glaring importance is the fact that the 
FBI CT Career Path currently fails to capitalize upon the expertise of its most 
experienced agents and to spread this expertise to a larger portion of the agency. Three 
critical courses of action that would significantly enhance the CT Career Path: a major 
overhaul of the agent mentoring system; the development of Mobile Education Teams to 
provide a forum for the most experienced CT agents to share their expertise with less 
experienced personnel; and the development of a Web-based forum such as a Center for 
Lessons Learned. 
Revamping the agent mentoring system is the first step in building the CT Career 
Path to preserve institutional memory and enhance knowledge management from the 
ground up. Currently, new agents are assigned a “training agent” as a mentor upon 
reporting to their first Field Office. Providing a forum for experienced input by a training 
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agent for the duration of the two year probationary agent period is a strong concept. In 
reality, however, there is significant variation in the effectiveness of the training 
agent/new agent pairing based on a variety of different factors, to include: 1) how the 
personalities interact; 2) how well the training agent is able to balance a demanding 
investigative schedule with the time needed to mentor and train; and 3) how adept the 
training agent is at infusing knowledge regarding investigation, source development, and 
administrative requirements.  
The development of Mobile Education Teams (MET) is a second step, and 
arguably, the most critical one, in bolstering the CT Career Path to preserve institutional 
memory and enhance knowledge management within the FBI. Particularly in the 
counterterrorism arena, this tool is underutilized in the FBI. This tool has the potential to 
provide great benefit, not only for the most experienced CT investigators, but also for the 
less experienced ones. Currently, the FBI is faced with a core of experienced CT 
investigators and analysts that have traveled worldwide to conduct large-scale 
counterterrorism investigations, some of whom have spent 75% to 100% of the calendar 
year deployed. Continued deployment at this rate is virtually impossible, leaving a wealth 
of CT experience ripe for utilization on a MET to provide a mechanism to share this 
knowledge while reducing the time away from home. This thesis proposes the initial 
implementation of two METs, housed within the Counterterrorism Division, comprised 
of agents and support personnel with extensive CT investigative deployment experience, 
and dedicated to the development of forward-leaning, flexible curricula to identify and 
address varying gaps in knowledge infusion. 
A third significant step in developing the CT Career Path involves the 
development of Web-based applications modeled after tools developed by homeland 
security partners, such as the U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned and the U.S. Marine 
Corps Center for Lessons Learned. Currently, the FBI has made progress in developing 
an FBI Center for Lessons Learned. This web-based forum continues to be developed 
through SharePoint technology for the sharing of CT knowledge. When fully 
implemented, it will be one critical step in maximizing the infusion of knowledge while 
minimizing antiquated learning processes.  
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The further development of the CT Career Path in order to build a proactive CT 
Developmental Plan will enable the FBI to strengthen the knowledge base of its 
counterterrorism personnel while benefiting from the expertise of its most experienced 
personnel. Additionally, the FBI will create vast opportunities to streamline the learning 
process and capitalize upon tried and true investigative tools to ensure that lessons 
learned are not lessons ignored. Evidence has been collected through extensive research 
and interview, as well as analysis of narratives and various best practices. Through this 
combination of factors, a tailored, newfound model for knowledge management within 
the FBI will be accomplished.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
1. Significance to the Literature 
As research to date has shown, the specialized and entwined missions of the FBI, 
as a critical international and domestic CT agency and a domestic intelligence agency, are 
unique to other agencies.  With limited literature regarding the infusion of knowledge in 
the counterterrorism arena, this thesis proposes the combination of a variety of methods 
to emphasize and maximize effective knowledge transfer. This combination of methods 
will result in the creation of a newfound strategic document, which can be used as a 
reference tool for a wide variety of homeland security entities as collective efforts are 
made to improve knowledge management and transfer to most effectively meet and 
counter the terrorism threat.  
2. Significance to Future Research Efforts 
While this research is aimed at greatly strengthening the knowledge base and 
success of investigative personnel working CT matters within the FBI, it is only one 
stepping stone in a continuous effort to build capacities and partnerships to more 
effectively combat and dismantle the terrorist threat. This research will culminate in a 
product that will be one of the first templates for consideration by the FBI. As the CT  
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arena is ever changing, it will be a template that documents existing material, offers 
viable solutions within the current environment, and provides a foundation for further 
research needed to meet evolving threats.   
3. Significance to the Immediate Consumer 
As the immediate consumers of this research, the FBI Counterterrorism Division 
and FBI Human Resources Division will have a proposed model and recommended 
strategies to ensure the enhanced preservation of institutional memory and the 
strengthening of overall core training of the FBI CT Special Agent population. Infusing 
knowledge from more experienced to less experienced personnel is critical not only 
within the complex CT arena, but also within each and every division of the FBI, which 
is the lead agency for all CT investigations. Even if this policy recommendation is 
implemented only within the FBI, it will have an equally dramatic effect on the CT 
preparedness of many of the partner federal, state and local agencies that work and train 
side-by-side with FBI personnel on CT matters, to include Task Force Officers on the 
FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces throughout the United States.  
4. Significance to Homeland Security Practitioners and Leaders 
Nationally 
This research seeks to provide a timely template that will propose viable strategies 
that may be implemented not only within the FBI but, possibly, on a wider scale within 
the homeland security arena. While the FBI is one of many partners in United States 
Intelligence Community (USIC) CT efforts, it retains primary jurisdiction in the United 
States and abroad for acts or attempted acts of terrorism perpetrated against U.S. citizens 
and U.S. interests. Historically, the FBI has played a leadership role in providing training 
to international, federal, state and local partners within the law enforcement arena. 
Taking this one step further, the FBI is presented with a challenge and an opportunity to 
again lead the way in providing premiere, necessary, and unparalleled training not only to 
its own personnel, but also to its partners in this multi-agency, international 
counterterrorism effort.  
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F.  METHOD 
The aforementioned literature review indicated there is little available research 
regarding knowledge preservation from experienced to less experienced homeland 
security CT practitioners, specifically within the FBI. This underdeveloped literature, 
therefore, requires a qualitative approach that will identify gaps, interpret plausible 
solutions, some of which are utilized by partner agencies, and formulate 
recommendations for implementation.  
In order to identify methods of knowledge preservation utilized by other entities, 
case studies and interviews will be conducted. Contributors will include various sectors 
of the FBI, to include Executive Management within the Counterterrorism Division and 
the Training Division, expert CT investigators, and Department of Defense personnel 
with oversight of Web-based networks such as the U.S. Army Center for Lessons 
Learned and the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.  Contributors will be 
asked to gauge the impact of a variety of knowledge management tools and their efficacy 
in preserving institutional memory and maximizing knowledge management. Tools such 
as mentoring systems, formalized vs. on-the-job training, the use of Mobile Education 
Teams, and the use of Web-based training and databases will be examined.   
While the aforementioned data will be qualitative in nature, it will be derived 
from experienced personnel who are well aware of extraneous, yet often constraining 
factors such as budgets, resource allocation, and personnel issues within the homeland 
security arena. Considering these critical factors, when this data is analyzed and applied 
to the CT Career Path and CT Developmental Plan, a viable strategy or road map will be 
proposed that can be implemented by the FBI to strengthen its CT work force, comprised 
of FBI and partner agency personnel.  
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II. IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT DEFICIT IN COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING 
A. ELEMENTS OF PRE 9/11 TRAINING 
In order to understand the CT training challenges facing the FBI, one must 
examine the pre-9/11 training opportunities for Special Agents working such matters. 
Prior to 9/11, all Special Agents completed 16-weeks of training at the FBI Academy in 
Quantico, Virginia, including subject matter training in each of the investigative areas 
under the jurisdiction of the FBI, as well as legal training, firearms, defensive tactics, 
practical exercises, computer training, evidence recovery, and basic forensics. During this 
training, agents were provided with approximately 24 hours of combined CT and 
counterintelligence (CI) instruction. While at the FBI Academy, agents received transfer 
orders to their first Field Offices, as well as assignments to particular squads and 
investigative disciplines.  
Regardless of their assigned investigative area, all new agents who reported to a 
Field Office were probationary agents for a period of two years from their entry-on-duty 
date. During this period, each agent was required to gain on-the-job experience in a 
variety of tasks, to include exposure to cases both within and outside of their assigned 
discipline, as well as experience in serving subpoenas, drafting affidavits, conducting 
searches and arrests, and testifying in court. A “training agent” was assigned to help 
guide each probationary Agent through the process. It should be noted that rarely was 
significant guidance provided to either the “training agent” or the probationary agent as 
to what the expectations of each position were. This disparate program resulted in a wide 
range of training methods and the effectiveness of the new agent training program. 
Once assigned to CT matters within a Field Office, agents competed for available 
training, often through a panel selection process, rather than being consistently provided 
with continuing training. The majority of CT training was offered by the FBI Academy or 
Central Intelligence Agency, both located in northern Virginia. For each available 
training opportunity, Field Offices were allocated a limited number of spaces, so that the 
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class sizes totaled approximately 40-50 students. These procedures and logistics were 
problematic for virtually all FBI offices outside of the Washington, DC area. The New 
York Field Office, for example, had in excess of five hundred Special Agents and Task 
Force Officers working CT matters, but was often assigned two or three spaces in a 
particular course. The Basic CT Course, a 40-hour training course for Special Agents and 
Task Force Officers, became part of the foundation for CT training. Nevertheless, 
availability of such training remained limited, and several personnel working CT matters 
were unable to attend this course for years, thereby precluding them from gaining 
pertinent instruction regarding the building blocks of CT casework. Part of this 
deficiency was addressed by the development of computer-based training to fill gaps 
where possible. Other training opportunities within the CT arena were available through 
the CIA, foreign entities, and regional conferences targeting specific CT matters. 
Obtaining CT training became very difficult, not only due to the space limitations and 
lack of available formalized training, but also due to the workload that prevented agents 
from gaining the necessary approval to leave their investigative duties at their Field 
Offices even briefly. Without a central repository for monitoring CT training, what 
transpired was the very uneven dispersal of training; some agents were fortunate to obtain 
several courses, while the majority was exposed to little or none.  
Another critical element of training in the CT arena comes from on-the-job 
experience. Attending courses and reading academic materials are vital, but they often do 
not provide adequate insight into the intricacies of CT work equal to that of being within 
the arena, face to face with suspected or known terrorists. This experience comes only 
through the crafting of investigative and debriefing strategies with the goals of not only 
securing information to prevent future attacks, but also bringing these subjects to justice 
through prosecution. While training and academic expertise are important in forming a 
solid understanding of culture and history, they provide only the foundation of 
knowledge that must be then successfully molded in relation to the particular personal 
history and personality of the suspect in order to be successful in reaching the 
aforementioned end states.      
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Prior to 9/11, on-the-job experience was gained often through the conduct of 
numerous large-scale CT investigations in high threat arenas, resulting in the 
development of substantial CT expertise. The examples are numerous, but a few of the 
most publicized complex CT investigative and evidence recovery successes include the 
1993 successful worldwide manhunt and prosecution of Mir Amal Kansi, who shot and 
killed two USG employees and wounded three others as they attempted to report to work 
at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia; the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi 
Arabia; the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania; and the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Aden, Yemen. These CT 
investigative and evidence-recovery operations were accomplished largely through the 
efforts of specialized squads and response teams within the FBI. The specialized squads 
are referred to as Extraterritorial Squads, tasked with addressing CT and other 
investigative matters affiliated with a designated area of the world. Naturally, agents 
developed vast expertise regarding terrorist organizations and operations endemic to their 
particular region of focus. These agents serve not only as case agents, but also frequently 
fill collateral duty roles as members of their Field Office Rapid Deployment Team 
(RDT).  
Comprised of a wide variety personnel, to include Special Agents, Special Agent 
Bomb Technicians, Evidence Recovery personnel, Intelligence Analysts, Computer 
Specialists, Language Specialists, Photographers, etc., RDTs are located in the 
Washington, DC, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York Field Offices. Each RDT is 
assigned response capabilities for a geographic region of the world. The personnel who 
serve on these RDTs as well as the Extraterritorial Squads have acquired a vast amount of 
CT and related investigative insight, which offers tremendous potential for further 
exploitation in terms of spreading this knowledge to larger segments of the FBI.  
B. 9/11–AN INDICATOR OF NEEDED CHANGE 
The tragic day of September 11, 2001 marked a new era in the need for 
organizational overhaul of the USG to meet the ever-evolving threat posed by terrorists. 
By successfully causing catastrophic damage on U.S. soil, terrorists ensured the 
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undeniable realization by the USG and the American public that there was no longer any 
safe haven from the threats posed to the United States, our citizens or our interests. The 
need for sweeping change was outlined by several entities, to include the 9/11 
Commission, who criticized the FBI for lack of fluidity in the sharing of information as 
well as the development and dissemination of intelligence, while recommending that the 
FBI realign internal efforts to meet its dual mission as a federal law enforcement and 
domestic intelligence agency. In response to the 9/11 attacks, “in the autumn of 2001, 
approximately 67%, or more than 4,000 of our agents in the field who previously worked 
on criminal investigative matters were diverted to investigate the September 11, 2001 
attacks or the subsequent anthrax attacks”13 to supplement the number of agents already 
assigned to CT matters. While these newly assigned agents were not optimally prepared 
to work CT investigations, which are governed by Attorney General Guidelines and other 
policies, they applied the 16 weeks of investigative training received as new agents at the 
FBI Academy, in combination with on-the-job expertise they had gained in various 
investigative arenas.  
Shortly after 9/11, the FBI was still undergoing great change in realigning 
personnel to meet investigative priorities. With the significant shift of personnel from 
more traditional criminal matters to terrorism matters, there was little CT training 
available to newly assigned personnel. Unfortunately, the FBI was unable to change the 
antiquated, centralized training opportunities described previously, in an efficient 
manner. Since the FBI was not in a position to immediately address this gap nationally, 
several local efforts were instituted. For example, the Miami Division of the FBI 
proposed and implemented a one-week training program for its agents, analysts and Task 
Force Officers. A Miami CT Special Agent developed the idea, gained approval, and 
sought the assistance of a team of personnel, representing multiple agencies, to 
implement the training. More than 100 interagency personnel benefited directly from the 
training, and several others were trained subsequently through portions of the training 
that were brought back to other agencies and implemented there. Although similar 
                                                 
13 “Report to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States–The FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001,” April 14, 2004, 12, 
www.fbi.gov/publications/commission/9-11commissionrep.pdf. 
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training programs were implemented in other locations, and shared with the FBI Training 
Division for possible widespread distribution, resources at that time did not allow for 
wider implementation. 
Interestingly, the FBI may have been more successful in implementing CT 
training for its state and local partners, as mandated by the USA PATRIOT Act, than it 
was for its own personnel. State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) was a 
course modeled after the “train-the-trainer” concept, in which a core of 200 personnel 
who received trained at the FBI Academy, in turn, provided CT training to an additional 
25,036 police officers within a nine-month period.14 Once again, this model represents 
the potential of exporting training to widespread personnel through the committed efforts 
of a small core of individuals.    
C. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF CHANGE WITHIN 
COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING 
The events of 9/11, in combination with the changing nature of the widely 
networked Al Qaeda threat, required the FBI to overhaul its deployment readiness 
capabilities and training. In 2002, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, testified to 
Congress regarding the creation of the Counterterrorism Division fly squads, currently 
called the Fly Team. Comprised of a cadre of 25 seasoned CT agents and four seasoned 
analysts, the Fly Team responds to worldwide acts of terrorism or high-profile 
investigations both within and outside of the U.S., often on short notice to austere and 
hostile environments. Fly Team overseas response occurs when there is either a U.S. 
nexus or a request for assistance by a foreign government. The three-fold mission of the 
Fly Team is worldwide crisis response, investigative support to domestic Field Offices 
and foreign Legal Attaché Offices, and the development of proactive strategic initiatives 
to fill CT gaps in under governed areas of the world that are plagued by CT activity and 
described in further detail below. 
To continually develop and hone the critical skills needed to operate in worldwide 
environments, the Fly Team proposed and implemented the most comprehensive CT 
                                                 
14 “Report to The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States–The FBI’s 
Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001,” 48. 
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training program devised to date within the FBI, known as the Fly Away Core Training 
(FACT) program. FACT is a three-month, full-time, intensive training program that 
focuses upon the development of the following mission essential skills: 1) CT subject 
matter expertise and cultural training; 2) advanced interview and interrogation; 3) 
interagency partnership; 4) advanced tactical and personal protection skills; 5) post blast 
and evidence recovery and 6) language skills. FACT training includes Personnel 
Recovery as well as Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) training, both of 
which aid in preparing Fly Team personnel to operate in virtually any overseas 
environment.  
The Fly Team is a unique and forward-thinking addition to the range of 
specialized entities the FBI employs to address large-scale CT investigation and response 
in that team members are no longer case agents who must balance full-time caseloads 
with unpredictable deployment schedules. As a result, on a routine basis, the Fly Team 
fills an expeditionary role in filling CT gaps in under governed arenas with rampant CT 
activity, to include strategic initiatives in such areas as the southern Philippines, the Horn 
of Africa, and Pakistan. To date, the many successes achieved through these proactive 
strategic initiatives include: enhanced partnership with and training of foreign law 
enforcement services; the development of confidential human sources to gain invaluable 
intelligence on indicted and unindicted terrorists in an effort to locate, apprehend, and 
bring them to justice; the identification, extensive interview, and return of U.S. citizen 
Daniel Maldonado to the United States, where he was tried and convicted of Material 
Support to Terrorism; and the identification of two $5 Million Dollar Rewards for Justice 
Fugitives. Shifting gears to its role in large-scale crisis response events, the Fly Team 
serves as the forward deployed, responding FBI entity in order to quickly establish liaison 
and investigative strategy, secure any perishable evidence and, in concert with the Legal 
Attaché, make recommendations to FBI Executive Management regarding the feasibility 
of the follow-on deployment of the larger Rapid Deployment Teams or case agent 
personnel often assigned to Extraterritorial Squads.  
Counterterrorism knowledge management is, arguably, more developed within the 
Fly Team than within and through any other CT entity in the FBI. Upon return from each 
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deployment, team members draft a comprehensive After Action Report (AAR) that 
delineates overseas actions, gaps, accomplishments and recommendations. These reports 
are used by FBI personnel to learn about best practices, lessons learned and particular 
areas of concern prior to additional deployments. Currently, these AARs are uploaded 
into the FBI Automated Case Support system, where any FBI employee may 
electronically retrieve them. However, with the shortfalls of this system, in comparison to 
what will be developed in the future as the FBI Center for Lessons Learned as a more 
user-friendly way to retrieve specific information, these reports currently serve a very 
small sector of personnel outside of the FBI Fly Team. Another knowledge transfer 
mechanism employed by the Fly Team involves verbal briefings to colleagues to spread 
innate knowledge from a small core of recently deployed personnel to a wider audience. 
In February 2008, based on the initiative of several team members, the Fly Team 
instituted a newfound knowledge transfer mechanism, centered upon a panel-based 
knowledge exchange wherein Fly Team personnel who had deployed to work CT matters 
in the southern Philippines provided comprehensive overviews, compared lessons learned 
and provided interactive feedback to participants. These knowledge management 
mechanisms provide tremendous opportunities for further exploitation, and will be 
further addressed concerning the recommendations to create Mobile Education Teams 
and a robust Web-based Center for Lessons Learned. 
Another possibility for the more fluid spread of knowledge emanates from an 
approved but not yet implemented transfer policy for Fly Team members that have 
completed their minimum three-year assignment to the team. With unparalleled training 
achieved through FACT, in combination with relentless deployment schedules that keep 
personnel on the road in excess of 50% of the year, there is an enormous untapped 
resource to be exploited by the broad range of FBI Field Offices throughout the country. 
Currently, Fly Team personnel wishing to depart the team to continue working as Special 
Agents have only the option of transferring to the Washington Field Office, where they 
are reassigned to the general investigative pool, resulting in possible assignment to non-
CT matters. Furthermore, Washington Field Office already possesses immense CT 
experience as evidenced by their active Extraterritorial Squads and Rapid Deployment 
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Team. Therefore, the FBI may be better served by spreading the expertise of Fly Team 
agents to Field Offices that lack this degree of overseas counterterrorism experience in 
order to serve as senior agents who can serve as mentors and bolster knowledge transfer 
from seasoned personnel to less seasoned personnel. Unfortunately, institutional budget 
constraints currently impede this revised transfer option until 2011.  
Within the past five years, the FBI has made marked improvements in its overall 
CT training program. New agents receive enhanced CT and CI training at the FBI 
Academy, augmented from 52 hours15 of training on 9/11 to 61 hours of training in 
2008.16 Such training is augmented by the development of a number of standardized CT 
courses and Web-based training now routinely available to FBI agents, as well as federal, 
state and local partners working on Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). Despite these 
improvements, such training continues to reach a limited number of personnel.  
Since 2003, the FBI has also greatly improved its CT training to more adequately 
prepare personnel to work overseas, at the “tip of the spear” to better understand the 
threat and to operate in environments that are often dangerous, hostile, or austere. While 
the FBI has conducted investigations in these arenas for years, it greatly augmented its 
presence through the deployment of personnel to the Afghanistan and Iraq Theaters of 
Operation, as well as to FBI Legal Attaché offices in countries including those with the 
most rampant terrorist activity. For approximately two years following 9/11, Agents 
deployed to these locations with minimal or no addition to their CT or tactical training. 
Since 2004, however, ten-day pre-deployment training was implemented and quickly 
became more successful than general CT training in that its target audience was smaller 
and more narrowly defined, allowing it to become a pre-requisite for deployment. Yet 
another example of driving change within the CT training arena occurred after President 
Bush requested changes to ensure the adequate combination of the domestic intelligence 
and law enforcement capabilities of the FBI resulting, in part, in the creation of the FBI 
National Security Branch (NSB) in 2005.  
                                                 
15 “Headline Archives: By the Numbers–FBI Transformation since 2001,” September 6, 2006, 
www.fbi.gov/page2/september06/numbers090606.htm. 
16 FBI Training Division, Unit Chief Debbie Beebe, March 5, 2008. 
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The NSB encompasses the Counterterrorism Division, Counterintelligence 
Division, Directorate of Intelligence, Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and the 
Terrorism Screening Center. Additionally, the FBI has initiated implementation of cross-
training personnel as intelligence officers as well CT agents/analysts. Such training 
greatly augments the wide range of skills of Special Agents, making them better prepared 
to apply these skills in real-world national security environments. With the creation of the 
NSB came plans also to enhance the Career Paths of personnel working CT matters. In 
this realm, CT Agents will be required to complete core and elective training courses 
which, at the end of five years of investigative experience in that arena, will result in 
obtaining a “specialty” certification. While these requirements continue to be delineated 
within the CT arena, they represent significant change in standardizing training and 
addressing previous gaps.  
Several of the component divisions of the National Security Branch have created 
specialized units to augment the training opportunities that continue to be researched and 
developed in concert with the traditional Training Division of the FBI, based in Quantico, 
Virginia. Within the CT arena, the NSB established the Continuing Education and 
Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) to guide the training that will become the 
foundation of the CT “specialty” to be earned by agents upon the completion of five 
years of CT investigative work, in combination with several core-training requirements. 
One of the outstanding accomplishments of CEPDU was the initiation of a 
Counterterrorism Working Group, comprised of individually selected personnel with 
extensive foreign and domestic CT experience within the interagency arena to assist in 
making recommendations for revised CT curricula and improvements. While this group 
has made significant contributions, its full potential remains stymied because participants 
remain fully assigned to operational, analytical or supervisory duties that often preclude 
participation.   
Another of the forward leaning accomplishments of CEPDU since its creation 
was the development and implementation of a six-week, intensive CT training curriculum 
for agents recently designated to the CT Career Path. In the fall of 2007, 40 agents 
returned to Quantico to receive a variety of specialized CT training, as an enhanced 
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building block to the CT instruction they received previously during New Agent 
Training. While the curriculum was an outstanding combination of historical and cultural 
information involving guest speakers from renowned academic institutions and 
government positions, provided practical applications of investigative techniques, and 
gave insight into overseas CT experiences, etc., the training was not optimally received. 
Several attendees expressed dissatisfaction with the length of time they were away from 
their Field Offices and cases, as well as the fact that some of the training did not relate to 
the exact types of CT cases they were currently working.  
Why is it that a significant number of the aforementioned students reacted 
negatively to one of the most positive CT training opportunities available in the FBI? One 
reasonable explanation is the mindset of FBI employees toward training, in particular. 
Many feel that if they are training, they are not advancing their cases. In essence, the 
positive results of training are not tangible, whereas the results of arrests and prosecutions 
are tangible. As the FBI further develops and implements strategic changes in its training 
curriculum, CEPDU and the Training Division must play leadership roles in changing the 
mindset of the organization as well as individual employees toward training.  
D. SNAPSHOT OF THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 
In September 2002, the Office of the Inspector General produced Report No. 02-
38, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterterrorism Program: Threat 
Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management. At that time, it was noted 
that, “the FBI has not issued a policy on or developed a system for capturing, 
disseminating, and using lessons learned from past terrorism incidents, operations, and 
exercises to improve the FBI’s counterterrorism capabilities.”17 Two of the fourteen 
recommendations, therefore, relate to the aforementioned knowledge management tool 
regarding lessons learned, as well as the establishment of a “core curriculum and 
minimum competencies for agents assigned to counterterrorism.”18 Approximately seven 
                                                 
17 Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 
Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management, Report 
02-38, September 2002, http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/audit/FBI/0238.htm. 
18 Ibid., 12. 
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years after this audit, the FBI is actively building the infrastructure to meet these 
important objectives. The FBI National Security Branch Strategic Training Plan 2009–
2013 acknowledges these objectives and several of the strategic goals include the 
following objective, “develop and update training courses to ensure timely and effective 
transfer of lessons learned from FBI and interagency operations.”19  
On a macro level, the FBI has utilized the Strategic Management System (SMS) 
as a planning and measurement tool to ensure that goals, objectives, and policies are 
aligned with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence goals and objectives as 
indicated in the National Intelligence Strategy, The United States Intelligence Community 
100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration, and the United States Intelligence 
Community 500 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration.20 One of the SMS 
components, Maximizing Workforce Success, includes the following goals that have 
been instrumental in guiding related development of and alignment with National 
Security Branch training goals and objectives.21 
• Improve recruiting, selection, hiring and retention 
• Train and develop skills and abilities of our workforce 
• Link skills and competencies to needs 
• Identify, develop and retain leaders throughout the organization 
• Enhance work environment to facilitate mission 
On March 5, 2008, Director Robert S. Mueller, III, provided a statement to the 
Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, regarding FBI priorities, changes, and 
challenges. Although the statement was not aimed specifically at addressing 
counterterrorism knowledge management or infusion, nevertheless, it revealed 
achievement, to date, by the FBI in meeting several of the above-listed goals, to include 
the training and development of employee skills, leadership development, and the 
enhancement of the work environment to facilitate the mission. The examples outlined by 
                                                 
19 Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI National Security Branch Strategic Training Plan 2009–2013 
(Washington, D.C.: Federal Bureau of Investigation, March 15, 2008), 7. 
20 Ibid., 9. 
21 Ibid. 
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the Director are centered on the fact that the Training Division of the FBI has made 
numerous training curriculum improvements, and has “expanded leadership, sabbatical, 
joint duty, and advanced degree programs.”22 To expand upon this information, within 
the past three years, there has been a significant increase in advanced degree 
opportunities available to FBI personnel within the realm of leadership, homeland 
security, and/or counterterrorism. The FBI has become an integral participant in the 
renowned programs of such institutions as the Naval Postgraduate School/Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, National Defense University, United States Military 
Academy, Naval War College, Princeton University, Harvard University/Kennedy 
School of Government, and Northwestern University/Kellogg School of Management. As 
the FBI continues to promote participation in these programs, significant steps are made 
in changing the aforementioned mindset toward training. An integral part of this 
continuing change process, however, will require a newfound focus on building 
mechanisms to examine, promote, and implement recommendations that often emanate 
from FBI work products while enrolled in these programs.    
 
                                                 
22 Robert S. Mueller, III, Statement before the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, 
March 5, 2008, www.fbi.gov. 
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III. CORE INFLUENCES TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED AND 
OVERCOME 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
While exceptional counterterrorism (CT) training exists, both operational tempo 
and scheduling limitations preclude a large number of personnel from obtaining the 
training. Finally, the organizational mindset within the FBI and individual behavior 
patterns remain focused on the short-term, tangible results inherent in investigative 
accomplishments/statistics rather than the long-term, less tangible benefits inherent in 
advanced training.  
In his book titled, Unleashing Change–A Study of Organizational Renewal in 
Government, Steven Kelman delineates the complexities of bureaucracies and provides 
research and insight on how to counter bureaucratic pitfalls to drive change. Kelman 
states,  
Where organizational change becomes difficult is where it requires 
modification of embedded individual behavior patterns or ways the 
organization has been structured. . .Change is easier when it involves 
adding an innovation to existing practice than when it involves. . .altering 
existing practice.23 
Concerning counterterrorism training in the FBI, it is critical that organizational 
practice and individual behavior patterns are changed. As Kelman delineates in 
Unleashing Change, social psychologist Kurt Lewin outlines the critical importance of 
unfreezing existing attitudes.24 Changing attitudes must take place through a newfound 
emphasis on and value in training, not only by the organization, but also by individual 
employees. Firstly, because “knowledge structures created by organizations [to include 
the FBI] make it hard for people to notice that change is needed,”25 an organizational 
                                                 
23 Steven Kelman, Unleashing Change–A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government 
(Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 4. 
24 Ibid., 33. 
25 Ibid., 25. 
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awakening must occur. Secondly, changing the individual mindset will occur only when 
personnel recognize the importance of receiving advanced training, which, in turn, will 
positively affect the development of their CT cases. In reality, training and operations 
correlate directly with each other: as the time spent on one increases, the time spent on 
the other decreases. Therefore, in the CT realm, investigators are often so heavily 
assigned that training opportunities, when available, are viewed as detrimental because 
they may postpone near-term operational progress. Furthermore, it can be extrapolated 
that personnel are so inundated that they fail to comprehend the need to obtain the 
training that would increase their knowledge base, reduce duplication of effort and, 
ultimately, speed up investigative success rather than slow it down.  
In relation to the difficulty of instituting change, Kelman acknowledges the 
abundance of literature that shows “that it is not truly that people resist change, but that it 
faces political and other challenges.” The FBI is not immune to these challenges. As with 
many bureaucracies, change often occurs slowly. As Kelman notes, literature by Robert 
Behan and Olivia Golden indicates, “managers should implement some part of a change 
quickly, rather than studying the idea to death until perfected, and make corrections along 
the way.”26 Arguably, in the case of providing ample, structured CT training to its 
personnel, the FBI has failed to achieve its fullest potential. While numerous, exceptional 
training opportunities exist in the CT realm, the aforementioned factors preclude the 
majority of personnel from receiving this training, resulting in a vicious circle. 
Employees are concentrating on CT matters, they view the work demands as too critical 
to take time to receive training or are unable to obtain training due to scheduling 
constraints, and they lose perspective on the fact that “training ha[s] a positive impact on 
behavior change.”27 Furthermore, training in the CT realm is important in the further 
development of perishable skills.  
In one respect, factors for driving successful change efforts in individual behavior 
and in organizational mindset diverge in several areas. To be successful at driving 
individual behavior change, a change effort in CT training in the FBI must accomplish 
                                                 
26 Kelman, Unleashing Change–A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government, 83. 
27 Ibid., 173. 
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the following: 1) provide timely, pertinent knowledge and skills that can be directly 
applied to case work; 2) minimize extraneous or duplicative information; and 3) ensure 
fluidity in the curriculum to account for the dynamic nature of the CT arena. To be 
successful at changing organizational mindset, the FBI must accomplish the following: 1) 
recognize and promote the importance of training in developing employee knowledge 
and skills; 2) create a working environment that allows time for training and development 
while minimizing detrimental effects on operational tempo; and 3) be relentless in 
communicating the leader’s change message because “stopping [the message] could be 
interpreted as the end of the executive’s commitment.”28  
Conversely, change efforts for both individual behavior and organizational 
mindset do converge in several areas. As Kelman states, “a change effort can feed on 
itself through positive feedback [and] early wins are important”29 to both the individual 
and the organization. Furthermore, recognizing the importance of the “change 
vanguard”30 is critical to the individual and the organization. By leveraging those that are 
ideologically discontent with the traditional system, exposing them to early wins in 
providing CT training, and utilizing the positive feedback to activate the discontented, 
successful change may be driven. All three elements outlined by Kelman, specifically, 
persuasive discussion, the burning platform and leader pressure,31 are critical in driving 
successful changes in counterterrorism training within the FBI and will be addressed in 
further detail in the recommendations section. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Kelman, Unleashing Change–A Study of Organizational Renewal in Government, 204. 
29 Ibid., 111-112. 
30 Ibid., 42. 
31 Ibid., 39. 
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B. CONTINUOUS SKILL BUILDING AND STORYTELLING: TWO 
IMPORTANT FACTORS IN EFFECTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT 
While the FBI has a renowned reputation of providing some of the most advanced 
training in the world to its personnel and liaison partners, it has arguably remained less 
effective within the realm of CT training and knowledge management. Without doubt, a 
small percentage of FBI employees benefit from some of the most advanced CT training 
and experience in the world. However, this training does not benefit the masses. Due to 
shortages in the number of training classes, it is not unlikely that a significant number of 
personnel work many years without more formal, updated CT training, with the exception 
of limited, Web-based training opportunities. In addition to these limitations, the FBI 
does not employ effective knowledge management tools in the CT training arena, 
meaning that it has failed to provide ample mechanisms for more experienced personnel 
to pass knowledge and skills to less experienced personnel. As business author David 
Maister indicates, “left unattended, knowledge and skill, like all assets, depreciate in 
value–surprisingly quickly.”32 Furthermore, as stated by Steven M. R. Covey, author of 
The Speed of Trust, “unless you’re continually improving your skills, you’re quickly 
becoming irrelevant. And when you’re irrelevant, you’re no longer credible.”33 In the CT 
arena, antiquated knowledge is no longer credible, and it also becomes an impediment to 
the development of forward-leaning practices to more effectively counter the terrorist 
threat.  
The transfer of CT knowledge occurs through formal training/academic studies, 
informal training, as well as first-hand experience within the arena. A small percentage of 
FBI employees possess a myriad of CT experience that is not only unparalleled, but also 
can not be duplicated through academic studies or formal training opportunities. 
Therefore, the deficiency that must be filled quickly is that of knowledge management or, 
more specifically, knowledge transfer regarding the personal counterterrorism 
experiences of personnel. Covey states, “when leaders structure opportunities and 
                                                 
32 Steven M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust (New York: Free Press, 2006), 93.  
33 Ibid., 98. 
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processes so that people teach what they learn to others within the organization, it 
dramatically increases individual and organizational learning and knowledge transfer.”34 
As the FBI continues to expand upon the counterterrorism training opportunities afforded 
to personnel, it must balance this critical need with unwavering operational needs as well 
as staffing shortages.  
One of the prominent mechanisms for creating networks of trust and driving 
change within the most elite business arenas is the utilization of “storytelling.” Why is 
storytelling important and what are its implications in the government CT arena?  
It is safe to assume that any individual or group you wish to influence has 
access to more wisdom than they currently use. It is also safe to assume 
that they also have considerably more facts than they can process 
effectively. Giving them even more facts adds to the wrong pile. They 
don’t need more facts. They need help finding their wisdom. Contrary to 
popular belief, bad decisions are rarely made because people don’t have 
all the facts. Bad decisions are made because people ignore the facts, do 
not understand the facts, or do not give the facts enough importance. 
Why? Basic human emotions like anxiety, greed, exasperation, 
intolerance, apathy, or fear have hijacked their brains and directed them to 
the “easy way out,” the “path of least resistance,” the “safe route,” or the 
“taking care of number one” option. More facts will not help them gain 
perspective. A story will. A story will help them figure out what all these 
facts mean.35 
Storytelling is an underutilized mechanism within the FBI CT training arena and 
provides tremendous opportunity to promote the infusion of knowledge from the most 
experienced CT personnel of the FBI to the less experienced personnel. In support of the 





                                                 
34 Covey, The Speed of Trust, 99. 
35 Annette Simmons, The Story Factor (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 51. 
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faced with a choice between drawing down best practice from a 
knowledge management ‘system’ and hearing the stories of 8/9 trusted 
individuals about their experiences the vast majority would opt for the 
stories. Narrative works in the same way, recording experiences as they 
occur and accessing them through high abstraction criteria such as 
archetypes and themes to reflect the natural process of enquiry.36 
In October 2008, the FBI Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer compiled several 
expert speakers to address several facets of knowledge management during “Knowledge 
Week,” which focused, in general, on the importance of enhancing knowledge 
management within the FBI as well as developing effective tools to guide these efforts. 
One participant, Paul Johnson, provided the following insight during his presentation 
entitled, “Tentative Lessons about Lesson Learning:” 
government agencies and private sector enterprises are rediscovering the 
value of informal but time honored storytelling practices. They are 
proving valuable not only as a means of communicating common norms 
and values and building “social capital”, but also as a relatively non-
threatening way to capture insight about what works.37 
Johnson also revealed,  
It appears that most Intelligence Community agencies could benefit 
greatly from a flexible, mixed approach–one that leverages exciting new 
information management and communication tools, experiments with a 
variety of “knowledge dissemination” activities that go well beyond 
formal classroom instruction, and borrows new insight from 
anthropologists and social psychologist about how to improve intuitive 
thinking and retain tacit knowledge within the organization.38 
It is the aforementioned, flexible and innovative approach that guides the 
combination of options and the ensuing recommendations to vastly improve the infusion 
of CT knowledge within the FBI.  
 
                                                 
36 David Snowden, “Just in Time KM–Conceptual Roots and Pragmatic Interventions,” 
www.greenchameleon.com, 6. 
37 Paul Johnson, Abstract: “Tentative Lessons about Lesson-Learning. Summary of Remarks during 
FBI Knowledge Week, October 19, 2007. 
38 Ibid. 
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IV. OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
The following three options are explored as methods for the FBI to address its 
inefficient mechanisms of knowledge management in the counterterrorism arena. 
• Status Quo 
• Development of the CT Career Path in concert with routine, but enhanced 
knowledge management mechanisms, to include the following: 
• Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer 
• Expert Registry 
• CT Readiness Index 
• Training Database 
• Center for Lessons Learned 
• Strategic Execution Team 
• CT Mobile Education Teams 
• Development of the CT Career Path in concert with more abstract 
knowledge management mechanisms 
• Cynefin Framework 
• Why Best Practices May Be a Misnomer 
In each of these, there is a need to address the following. 
• Mindset toward Training 
• Operational Tempo 
A. OPTION I: MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO 
Maintaining the status quo is one option as the FBI continues to undergo 
significant change in developing further as America’s lead federal law enforcement and 
domestic intelligence agency. As outlined previously, FBI employees receive renowned 
training as they begin their careers at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia; a factor 
that, combined with a tireless work ethic, unwavering commitment to protecting and 
defending the Constitution, as well as providing superior service to the Nation, make the  
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organization very successful in fulfilling its mission. Despite continuous success, 
however, in this era of working harder and smarter than ever before, maintaining the 
status quo no longer offers the most viable arena for driving continued change.  
If the status quo were maintained, the progression of a CT investigator through 
the CT Career Path would likely be as follows.39  
1. Stage 1 (New Agent Training) 
• Complete 21-weeks of New Agents Training at Quantico, Virginia, 
focusing on all aspects of being a Special Agent, to include 61 hours of 
CT training 
2. Stage 2 (Post New Agent Training to Three Years) 
• Work CT investigations in a Field Office, where he/she is assigned a 
Training Agent/Mentor, who assists the new Agent and provides on-the-
job training during his/her two year probationary period 
• Obtain CT Stage II Academy training at Quantico, Virginia, a six-week 
comprehensive training program implemented in the fall of 2007, initially 
reaching 40 CT Agents. (Note: if the size and frequency of CT Stage II 
Academy classes offered in 2008 were maintained through 2009 and 
beyond, the training of all Agents assigned to the CT Career Path would 
take approximately 20 years. Since the ultimate goal of Stage II Academy 
training is to reach all Agents assigned to the CT Career Path, it is critical 
that additional means to more expeditiously provide the training are 
achieved). 
• Obtain periodic, often sporadic CT training as available at the FBI 
Academy or through other domestic and international partner agencies 
• Core Competency training. Ten core competencies are the foundation for 
the Special Agent Career Paths and are required of all Special Agents, as 
follows.40  
• Writing Effectively 
• Organizing, Planning and Prioritizing 
• Communicating Orally 
• Relating Effectively With Others 
                                                 
39 Draft Counterterrorism Developmental Plan, Revised November 16, 2007. 
40 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation National Security Branch Strategic 
Training Plan 2009–2013 Appendix, version dated March 15, 2008, 18. 
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• Attending to Detail 
• Critical Thinking, Information Evaluations/Judgment and Decision 
Making 
• Initiative and Motivation 
• Adapting to Changing Situations 
• Maintaining a Professional Image 
• Physical Requirements   
3. Stage 3 (Three to Five Years) 
• Complete a variety of training courses, in-services, conferences and joint 
agency meetings 
• Core Competency training 
4. Stage 4 (Five+ Years) 
• Complete advanced training with international partners 
• Complete mission critical and specialty courses 
• Core Competency training 
In further expanding the Core Competency training that occurs in Stage 2, Stage 3, and 
Stage 4 of the CT Career Path, program-centric competencies remained under 
development, but the following four job-related/technical competencies for Special 
Agents were adopted.41 
• Ability to Lead 
• Physical Requirements 
• Analytic Thinking 
• Intelligence Writing in the FBI Organizational Style  
The additional competencies listed above, once again, fail to target directly and 
aggressively the critical need to enhance FBI knowledge transfer mechanisms with the 
CT Career Path. 
                                                 
41 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Career Development Competency Dictionary, June 11, 2008.  
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Efficiency is directly and negatively influenced by maintaining the status quo. 
When training reaches only a small percentage of personnel, it leaves the remainder to fill 
in those gaps as practicable with methods which include such options as pure trial and 
error, which can result in an increased percentage of misguided steps; obtaining guidance 
from a colleague, a time-consuming process which may result in reduced efficiency; or 
conducting research to fill in gaps with information that has, most likely, already been 
researched and enacted by others, in essence, duplicating effort.  An example of these 
intricacies was readily apparent shortly after the 9/11 attacks.  
With hundreds of personnel diverted from criminal matters to work the 9/11 
counterterrorism investigation in south Florida, where the majority of the hijackers had 
resided, it quickly became apparent that there were no formal means for efficiently 
transferring knowledge from seasoned CT personnel to less seasoned personnel during 
the crisis management phase. While very capable investigators and analysts, the newly 
assigned personnel often lacked understanding of such things as governing regulations 
surrounding such cases and cultural considerations when conducting interviews, for 
example.  
During the crisis management phase of 9/11 investigations in south Florida, what 
resulted was the implementation of informal mechanisms for the passage of knowledge 
from more experienced personnel to less experienced personnel. The establishment of 
daily shift briefings became forums for the passage of some knowledge but, considering 
that such briefings only occurred a few times per day, they still did not adequately and 
efficiently pass knowledge. As a result, several experienced CT personnel were sought 
out for advice and mentoring concerning thousands of CT-related matters being worked 
by less experienced personnel. These experienced personnel provided immediate 
guidance and knowledge to the less experienced personnel, but doing so in a one-on-one 
environment did not allow for the optimal use of time for these busy “experts.” 
Oftentimes, these “experts” were asked the same types of questions by different 
personnel throughout the day, resulting in the need to repeat many of the same important 
lessons. While this was an important stopgap at the time, it was readily apparent that 
there was a critical need to institute a more efficient mechanism of knowledge transfer.  
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As a result, one Miami employee recommended, developed and implemented a 
one-week interactive training curriculum to ensure the transfer of critical pieces of 
knowledge to newly assigned personnel, not only representing the FBI, but also 
numerous partner agencies. The training served as a “train the trainer” program, allowing 
attendees to take the knowledge back to their departments/colleagues and, again, spread 
the knowledge that was infused. The same principle that guided the development of the 
aforementioned training again guides the development of mechanisms to improve the 
infusion of CT knowledge as outlined in the following portion of this thesis. For this 
reason, maintaining the status quo is not an option.      
Maintaining the status quo is, truly, a non-viable option in that it requires the FBI 
to ignore the insights and recommendations made by numerous entities to include the 
9/11 Commission, the Robb-Silberman (WMD) Commission, the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Office of the Inspector General, the National Academy 
for Public Administration, etc., and the requirements initialized by Executive Order 
13434, National Security Professional Development. Secondly, while the enemies who 
threaten our national security continue to develop methods to bring harm to the United 
States, our citizens, and our interests worldwide, the homeland security community must 
remain equally innovative and committed in deterring and defeating them. As a result, it 
is critical that the FBI “drive people out of their comfort zones”42 to effectively foster 
change, making the status quo unacceptable. Thirdly, maintaining the status quo would 
not maximize the continued growth of the FBI as a worldwide partner in combating 
terrorism while building its own capacity and that of others to more effectively address 
the CT threat.    
B. OPTION II: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CT CAREER PATH IN 
CONCERT WITH ROUTINE, BUT ENHANCED KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS 
The commitment of the FBI to adapt continually to optimize its preparation to 
meet its number one priority of counterterrorism is the guiding impetus behind the 
                                                 
42 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business Review, 
March-April 1995, 60. 
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continued development of the CT Career Path and training program. In developing 
existing mechanisms in combination with some routine, but enhanced knowledge 
management mechanisms, there are substantial opportunities for career development, 
improved knowledge transfer, and increased organizational efficiency. In 2005, the 
National Academy of Public Administration provided ten recommendations concerning 
FBI counterterrorism operations, only three of which are remotely associated with 
knowledge management and training, as delineated below. 
• The Panel recommends that immediate steps be taken to develop an initial 
scheme for evaluating the performance of counterterrorism agents in the 
field, that it be incorporated into agent training, and updated as needed.43 
Comment: In relation to knowledge management, this recommendation 
could be implemented through the correlation of CT agent performance 
evaluations with the effectiveness of these agents in infusing 
knowledge/passing lessons learned to less experienced personnel. This 
proposed mechanism is further delineated in the recommendation section. 
• The Panel recommends that the FBI promote the sharing of information on 
best practices for state watch and warning systems among state and local 
law enforcement and that it work with the relevant DHS components to 
accomplish this.44 
Comment: While this recommendation relates to the sharing of best 
practices from the FBI, in concert with DHS, for state watch and warning 
systems related to state and local law enforcement, it does not address the 
broader need to share best practices within the FBI, as a whole, or 
throughout the many facets of the homeland security arena, in general. 
This proposed mechanism is further delineated in the recommendation 
section.  
• The Panel recommends that the FBI improve its performance measures, 
making sure that they are clearly linked to the satisfaction of its strategic 
goals and objectives.45 
Comment: While the FBI has examined and aligned its performance 
measures with its strategic goals and objectives, it continues to fall short 
on linking these important concepts with enhanced knowledge 
management requirements. This proposed mechanism is further delineated 
in the recommendation section. 
                                                 
43 Dick Thornburgh, Chair, et al., Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital 
Program (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Public Administration, September 2005). 
44 Ibid., 46. 
45 Ibid., 47. 
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Concerning strategic management, the report also delineated the following 
recommendation. 
• The Panel recommends, at a minimum, that the FBI moves to, and 
Congress supports, a multi-year resource planning system for critical 
technical systems and key personnel skills. In addition, it recommends that 
the FBI actively seek to broaden the training and experience of personnel, 
including agents, by encouraging enrollment in external management and 
technical training programs, and by promoting assignments to other 
agencies.46 
Comment: The FBI has made great progress in regard to these 
recommendations. Specifically, the FBI has made significant 
improvements in the training of personnel in regard to leadership and 
management training, such as that received at the Kellogg School of 
Management and the United States Military Academy, a substantial 
increase in the number of advanced degree training opportunities such as 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Harvard University, Princeton 
University, Tufts University, Naval War College, Marine Corps Command 
and Staff College, etc., as well as the development and implementation of 
numerous joint duty training and assignments. As the FBI continues to 
offer significant training opportunities in concert with its partners, it is 
critical that methods of capitalizing on both the research conducted by FBI 
personnel enrolled in these programs, and the enhanced skill sets 
developed. This proposed mechanism is further delineated in the 
recommendation section. 
1. Building Knowledge Management from the Ground Up 
In October 2007, the FBI established the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer 
to “establish knowledge libraries of products, to develop a knowledge enterprise 
architecture that identifies system content and usage, and to create knowledge sharing 
and collaboration programs such as expert registries, lessons learned, best practices, and 
communities of interest.”47 
As outlined by the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer, the following table 
represents the knowledge management challenges faced by the FBI in the realms of 
environment, organization and evolution:48 
                                                 
46 Thornburgh, Transforming the FBI: Roadmap to an Effective Human Capital Program, 23. 
47 Federal Bureau of Investigation, OCKO: Background, http://ocko.fbinet.fbi/background.htm. 
48 Federal Bureau of Investigation, OCKO: Challenges, http://ocko.fbinet.fbi/challenges.htm. 
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ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATION EVOLUTION 




Sharing to Reduce 
“Knowledge Hoarding” 
Organizational Acceptance Obtain Timely Feedback 
from Knowledge 
Producers and Consumers
Promote practices to 
become a “Learning 
Organization” 
Overcoming Change Fatigue Support Geographically 
Dispersed Organization 
and Diversity of 
Employees  
Progress from Hoarding to 
Scalable to Repeatable to 
Optimized 
Table 1.   Knowledge Management Challenges 
2. Building an Expert Registry, A Counterterrorism Readiness Index 
and a Comprehensive Training Database 
The professional and personal experiences of FBI personnel in the CT arena and 
related realms provide the FBI with a ready reserve of some of the most qualified CT 
personnel in the world. Personnel possess a variety of deployment and training 
experience, foreign language capabilities, and additional specialized skills needed within 
the CT arena. While there are a variety of mechanisms that serve as registries of these 
experiences, there is no central, easily-accessible repository for such information at the 
current time. As outlined by the Chief Knowledge Officer and the Associate Executive 
Assistant Director (A/EAD) of the National Security Division, the latter of which leads 
the Strategic Execution Team formed to address strategic gaps, there is a strong need for 
the development of a comprehensive Expert Registry of skills in addition to what has 
been termed by the A/EAD as a Counterterrorism Readiness Index (CRI). The CRI 
assigns points to training and skills developed by CT personnel working within the CT 
Career Path. As these personnel accumulate points through training received, deployment 
experience, etc., they earn points that move them from a readiness rating of “red” to 
“yellow” to “green.”  
In addition to delineating the range of experience gained by personnel through the 
CRI, it is vital that the FBI develop an Expert Registry that allows the Bureau to identify 
quickly and easily the personnel who possess the greatest combination of skills required 
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for often complex and specialized missions worldwide. An extension of the importance 
of the CRI is the ability to build a useful, user-friendly database to catalog training 
received, so that gaps may be easily identified and addressed. Considering the diverse, 
and sometimes hostile or austere operating environments within which the FBI works, it 
is critical that a comprehensive, effective tracking system be created to readily identify 
the need for recertification/renewal of specialized training such as within the fields of 
advanced tactical or evidence recovery skills. In February 2009, the Human Resources 
Branch, Career Path Unit launched a management software tool known as Manage Your 
Career (MY Career). Although in its infancy this database, if fully developed and 
utilized, has the potential to serve as a mechanism to catalog and track skills/training, as 
well as to quickly identify specialized skill sets.  
3. Building a Center for Lessons Learned 
In an effort to develop mechanisms to pass more efficiently lessons learned to a 
wider number of personnel, the FBI is in the process of developing a Web-based FBI 
Center for Lessons Learned. The backbone of the FBI Center for Lessons Learned will be 
through the FBI Intranet, specifically using Microsoft SharePoint technology. The FBI 
Center for Lessons Learned will possess capabilities similar to and, in some cases, 
improvements upon the Army Center for Lessons Learned and the Marine Corps Center 
for Lessons Learned, both of which are robust programs aimed at providing personnel 
with readily accessible knowledge. In the instances of these centers, for example, 
personnel who have learned important information during combat scenarios may 
effectively pass the knowledge to others through the appropriate Web-based centers, 
allowing others to gain this knowledge without also having to endure combat situations. 
As a result, the number of personnel who benefit from the lessons of a few increases 
dramatically, resulting in enhanced knowledge transfer and a substantial increase in core 
knowledge.  
By developing a template for experienced CT personnel to document their lessons 
learned, smart practices, etc., and by uploading this information into the appropriate 
SharePoint site, FBI and Task Force employees have and will continue to gain the 
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opportunity to search for needed information and to learn from the experiences of their 
colleagues, thus lessening the need to “recreate the wheel” and increasing efficiency in 
knowledge transfer. Numerous applications within SharePoint promote streamlined 
research, collaboration and knowledge management capabilities. For example, 
SharePoint technology includes MySite opportunities for individual users to configure 
their own websites, allowing them to set notification alerts when information is available 
regarding topics of specific interest, for example. Additionally, SharePoint allows the 
development and utilization of shared sites, allowing multiple entities to work more 
efficiently on collaborative efforts. As stated by John T. Wydra, Jr., in a presentation 
entitled, Utilizing SharePoint 2007 Technology at the FBI, “the FBI needs a quick, 
secure, scalable and inexpensive way to track unstructured data such as documents, 
forms, discussions, and ad-hoc surveys in a searchable, auditable system that is flexible to 
change as our needs do.”49 As evidenced by a few of the aforementioned capabilities of 
the software, SharePoint will assist in addressing many gaps.  
The implementation of the FBI Center for Lessons Learned is an enormous 
project that requires the identification, documentation, review, and upload of voluminous 
amounts of information. Personnel who represent the West Point Combating Terrorism 
Center and the United States Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned continue to assist 
the FBI in developing pertinent procedures and materials. One important element to 
develop is the creation and use of Collection Teams, whose task is to focus the collection 
of information on important, priority matters. Modeled after the practice of the Marine 
Corps with the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, whose Collection Teams often 
deploy forward to conduct the collection of specific information, and to report their 
results to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned through various media in order to 
ensure the identification of emerging issues and trends, FBI Collection Teams could 
focus forward deployed efforts on the identification, collection, and analysis of 
information relative to priority CT investigations.50  
                                                 
49 John D. Wydra, Jr., Utilizing SharePoint 2007 Technology at the FBI, Presentation and PowerPoint 
Slides, October 2007.  
50 Draft Strategic Management System Document, FBI Counterterrorism Division, Lessons Learned 
Program, March 1, 2008.  
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One component of this process relates to knowledge libraries. As delineated by 
the Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer, knowledge libraries are being compiled 
throughout several facets of the FBI to share a myriad of information, to include best 
practices and lessons learned. Elements of the Counterterrorism Division, namely the 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and its parent unit, the Domestic Terrorism and 
Response Section, have web sites to publish their best practices. With any new tools, 
however, there remains a need to develop these tools continually so that they become 
effective resources. At the current time, without either a unit of personnel dedicated to 
this function, or entrenched Collection Teams as outlined above, the growth and usage of 
the information remains slow.  
4. The Development of the Strategic Execution Team to Drive Change 
In September 2007, Director Mueller appointed two Executive Managers to head 
a Strategic Execution Team, comprised of approximately 55 personnel from 
Headquarters and Field Offices to assist in driving further progress concerning recruiting, 
training and career development throughout the organization. The Strategic Execution 
Team has grown into an entity of approximately 100 people and is supported by the 
management consulting firm McKinsey and Company. In November 2007, Director 
Mueller provided an update to the FBI as to the progress of the SET, indicating that the 
team’s focus areas would be as follows.51   
• Program Management Office–geared toward the alignment of initiatives, 
processes and priorities in order to reach goals. (Note: important sub-
components of this office include a Networks Team and a Mindset and 
Behaviors Team, both of which are critical in instituting organizational 
change and will be discussed in further detail in the recommendations 
section) 
• Human Capital–geared toward improving recruitment, selection, 
development and promotion of agents and analysts to more effectively 
meet the FBI intelligence mission (Note: an important sub-component of 
this element includes the Agent Career Path and Training Team. The 
critical connection between this team and the Program Management 
Office/Networks Team as well as the Mindset and Behaviors Team will be 
delineated in the recommendations section) 
                                                 
51 FBI Intranet, SET: Frequently Asked Questions, http://intranet.fbinet.fbi/set/faq.htm. 
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• Intelligence Operations–geared toward enhancing the Field Intelligence 
Group structure, performance measures, intelligence production as well as 
dissemination 
SET management meets with Director Mueller on a weekly basis, while the SET gathers 
information from across the FBI in order to design pilot programs that may include visits 
to Field Offices to conduct training, focus groups and Town Hall meetings in order to 
address identified initiatives.  
The SET identified eleven work streams to be addressed within the subprograms 
of Program Management, Intelligence Operations and Human Capital, three of which 
relate to or are peripherally related to knowledge management as follows: understand the 
strength of internal networks for information sharing; align organizational mindsets 
around transformation; and create clarity around career paths and training programs for 
agents/analysts.52 These work streams have been aligned with the overall FBI strategy 
map, which includes numerous objectives in the fields of resources, talent and 
technology, internal processes, and American public expectations. As of August 2008, 
the SET implemented Waves 1 through 3 of its Intelligence Operations subprogram, 
specifically directed at enhancing intelligence capabilities.  
5. CT Mobile Education Teams 
Each of the aforementioned mechanisms of knowledge management is in various 
stages of development, offering tremendous promise for enhancing the infusion of 
knowledge to a larger percentage of the CT workforce. One underutilized and critical 
mechanism, however, that lies at the core of this option for driving change is the 
development and implementation of Mobile Education Teams in the CT arena. While the 
FBI possesses numerous variations of Mobile Education Teams with varied foci, to date, 
such METs have not been created to address knowledge management issues within the 
CT arena. Furthermore, the proposed development of CT METs involves a newfound 
combination of seasoned personnel to include those from the most actively deployed 
                                                 
52 T. J. Harrington, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director’s Strategic Execution Team Briefing for 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Staff, February 5, 2008, 2.  
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units for counterterrorism matters, such as the Fly Team and Extraterritorial Squads, 
Assistant Legal Attaches (Supervisory Special Agents) who have completed tours of duty 
in overseas offices, as well as what may be the most underutilized resource in the FBI, its 
retired personnel. Regarding the latter, the expertise and knowledge possessed by our 
retirees, often with 20 to 35 years of service, cannot be underestimated. 
The establishment of CT Mobile Education Teams within the FBI would provide 
individuals with an exceptional degree of CT experience to share their knowledge 
immediately with less seasoned personnel, while simultaneously providing a finite respite 
from the direct CT arena, which, at times, has required the deployment of personnel for 
the majority of the calendar year. This symbiotic relationship would be aimed not only at 
enhancing the transfer of knowledge, but also at providing a more predictable, stable 
environment for the MET members who, at the end of their assignments to the MET, may 
be more apt to return to working CT matters rather than other violations, resulting in 
continued opportunities to share CT expertise. Further details regarding the structure of 
the proposed teams, their multifaceted mission in support of improving knowledge 
management in the FBI, and their proposed interface with other segments of the FBI are 
detailed in the Implementation of Strategy and Recommendation sections.  
C. OPTION III: DEVELOPMENT OF THE CT CAREER PATH IN 
CONCERT WITH ROUTINE AND ABSTRACT KNOWLEDGE 
MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS 
As numerous fields evolve over time so, too, has the field of knowledge 
management. While KM previously focused upon ‘tacit’ knowledge, that which is 
contained within personal experience, and ‘explicit’ knowledge, that which is contained 






the importance of narrative and concrete knowledge: we always know 
more than we can say and we will always say more than we can write 
down. Learning communities act as critical mechanisms for the transfer of 
concrete knowledge through imitation and mentoring, but also define and 
are defined by their narratives.53 
In examining the field of knowledge management, what framework can be 
utilized to address the complexities of counterterrorism knowledge and the critical nature 
of enhancing the infusion of this knowledge to a greater percentage of personnel? The 
Cynefin framework, developed by David Snowden, Mary Boone and other contributors, 
appears to provide the context required to understand and address the aforementioned 
complexities. “Cynefin, pronounced ku-nev-in, is a Welsh word that signifies the multiple 
factors in our environment and our experience that influence us in ways we can never 
understand”54 resulting in the important acknowledgement that “the world is often 
irrational and unpredictable.”55 The framework is divided into five contexts based on the 
relationship between cause and effect, as follows. 
• Simple contexts–known knowns 
• Complicated contexts–known unknowns 
• Complex contexts–unknown unknowns 
• Chaotic contexts–unknowables 
• Disorder–unclear which of the aforementioned contexts is dominant 
The aforementioned contexts, with the exception of the fifth context of disorder, are also 
prevalent in more routine knowledge matrices, such as the Knowledge Matrix depicted 
on the left. This Knowledge Matrix is posted on the internal Intranet website of the FBI 
Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer. While it relates to the aforementioned cynefin 
framework, depicted on the right, it does not provide the additional element to address the 
complicated and chaotic realms of cause-effect that the cynefin framework provides, 
particularly in the fifth context of “disorder” in which it is not known which of the other 
                                                 
53 David J. Snowden, “From Atomism to Networks in Social Systems,” www.greenchameleon.com. 
October 4, 2007, 3. 
54 David J. Snowden and Mary E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard 
Business Review, http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/hbsp/hbr/articles/article, 1. 
55 Ibid., 2. 
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four contexts one is in. Since the complex and chaotic contexts are unordered, cause and 
effect are not readily discernible and the focus must be on emerging patterns over time.56  




Table 2.   Knowledge Matrix vs. Five Contexts of the Cynefin Framework 
Within the complicated context, two possible obstacles are ‘entrained thinking,’ being 
blinded to new ways of thinking, or ‘analysis paralysis’ where conflicting, entrained 
thinking among experts inhibits creative solutions.59 One solution involves placing 
people in unfamiliar environments to stimulate innovation. As described by John Kotter 
in the Harvard Business Review article entitled, “Leading Change: Why Transformation 
Efforts Fail,” the inability to “drive people out of their comfort zones”60 is often a critical 
part of transformation failure. In combining these assertions, it will be critical that the 
FBI effectively implement this transformation tool to infuse CT knowledge effectively 
from its more experienced personnel to its less experienced personnel. 
While the right answer(s) exist within the complicated context, the complex 
context does not contain a right answer, requiring decisions to be made on incomplete 
data. “In this domain, we can understand why things happen only in retrospect. 
                                                 
56 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 6. 
57 Ibid., 9. 
58 Federal Bureau of Investigation, OCKO: Background, http://ocko.fbinet.fbi/background.htm. 
59 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 3. 
60 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business Review 
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Instructive patterns, however, can emerge if the leader conducts experiments that are safe 
to fail. That is why, instead of attempting to impose a course of action, leaders must 
patiently allow the path forward to reveal itself. They need to probe first, then sense, and 
then respond.”61 The need to revamp counterterrorism training and to enhance knowledge 
management within the FBI falls within the realm of the complex context. Since 
interactions in this context are not linear, even minor changes have the possibility of 
producing substantial results.62 The creation of the Strategic Execution Team by Director 
Mueller has “created an environment from which good things can emerge, rather than 
trying to bring about predetermined results and possibly missing opportunities that arise 
unexpectedly.”63  
This thesis promotes the extension of the aforementioned flexibility to the 
proposed Mobile Education Teams in order to allow them to utilize the cynefin complex 
context as an instrumental part of their guiding principles. Armed with this flexibility, the 
METs would be empowered to “probe, sense and respond,” thus tailoring instruction and 
knowledge management exchange to emerging patterns. The result would be a departure 
from the pre-planned, often more rigid, curriculum most often associated with FBI CT 
training to date.  
The chaotic context is plagued by turbulence rather than any emerging patterns of 
cause and effect. This context requires a leader to act in an effort to move the context 
from chaotic to complex. This portion of the cynefin network was readily apparent in the 
homeland security arena immediately following the 9/11 attacks. As previously outlined, 
when the rapidly-evolving crisis caused the Miami Division of the FBI to reassign 
hundreds of personnel to counterterrorism matters without providing formalized 
knowledge transfer and training, it was forced to operate between the contexts of chaotic 
and disorder. Patterns either were not emerging or were masked by the breadth, 
complexity and unpredictable nature of developments. When CT training was developed 
by the Miami Division, it moved operations and knowledge infusion from the chaotic 
                                                 
61 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 4. 
62 Ibid., 6. 
63 Ibid., 8. 
 47
context to the complex context. Similarly, the shift from the chaotic to the complex arena 
is critical in driving necessary change within the realm of CT knowledge management 
because it allows for the emergence of patterns and development of tailored tools to 
address these patterns.  
D. WHY BEST PRACTICES MAY BE A MISNOMER 
As the FBI continues to strengthen its development as the primary federal law 
enforcement agency and domestic intelligence agency, it continues to develop 
mechanisms to transfer knowledge through best practices. The Counterterrorism Division 
of the FBI, for example, has acknowledged the need to capture and disseminate best 
practices, yet the Web-based portion of the knowledge library has not yet developed into 
a robust, reliable, or functional tool for the majority of its workforce. It is important that 
the FBI continue to understand that best practices at one particular time may not, in fact, 
be best practices at a subsequent time, particularly due to the fact that the CT-arena is 
ever-changing. “It’s important to remember that best practice is, by definition, past 
practice.”64 The FBI must remain committed to the constant examination of practices so 
that creativity and innovation are not stifled.  
It is worth remembering that the primary purpose of knowledge 
management is to enable better decision making and to create the 
conditions for innovation; better decision making is contingent on active 
learning, innovation is dependent on disruption of entrained patterns of 
thinking.65 
These ‘entrained patterns of thinking’ can be equated with antiquated practices or 
perceived ‘best practices’ that only guise forward leaning strategies to most effectively 
counter terrorism.  
                                                 
64 Snowden and Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” 3. 
65 David J. Snowden, “Managing for Serendipity or Why We Should Lay Off ‘Best Practice’ in KM,” 
www.cognitive-edge.com/ceresources/articles/39_managing_for_serendiptiy_final.pdf, 6. 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF STRATEGY 
As stated in a Naval Postgraduate School thesis entitled, Transforming 
Leadership in the FBI: A Recommendation for Strategic Change, Supervisory Special 
Agent Richard D. Schwein stated,  
changes are being driven internally by FBI executives who understand the 
urgency required to navigate the FBI’s strategic shift from a domestically 
focused, case and fact driven, predominantly law enforcement culture to a 
much more agile, threat and intelligence driven, globally focused and fully 
integrated culture of law enforcement and national security excellence.66  
The processes involved in this continuing strategic shift present tremendous opportunity 
to address ineffective mechanisms for exporting the knowledge and expertise from the 
most experienced core of CT investigators to less experienced investigators. As a result, 
the FBI must devise and implement a strategic plan to enhance and maximize the CT 
training available to its personnel by leveraging knowledge gained in the field, exporting 
it to additional personnel, and simultaneously enhancing core capacities. It is 
recommended that the FBI pursue a strategy that encompasses both Options I and II as 
delineated above.   
The strategic shift of the FBI can be compared to a shift in the business arena that 
involves identifying and capitalizing upon unchartered territory to build market share. In 
the work entitled, Blue Ocean Strategy, W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne delineate 
how companies compete in today’s market to find newfound territory, or “blue oceans” in 
order to diverge from the saturated, “red oceans” that prevent company growth, profit, 
and success. The following tools outlined in Blue Ocean Strategy, specifically the Four 
Actions Framework, Strategy Canvas, Value Innovation, and Environmental Scan, reflect 
the sectors of unchartered blue ocean that are primed for the FBI to imaginatively address 
and conquer in regard to its knowledge management and training deficiencies. 
                                                 
66 Richard D. Schwein, Transforming Leadership in the FBI: A Recommendation for Strategic 
Change (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2007), 87. 
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A. FOUR ACTIONS FRAMEWORK 
ELIMINATE 
• Investigative Silos 
• Inability to Transfer 
Lessons Learned 
• Antiquated Training 
Practices 
RAISE 
• Preservation of Institutional Memory 
• CT Core Capabilities 
REDUCE 
• Redundancy and 
Recreating the Wheel 
• Burnout of 
Experienced Personnel 
• Negative Mindset 
Toward Training  
CREATE 
• Institutional Change 
• Streamlined Knowledge Transfer  
• Value in Training/Exporting Knowledge 
• Regional and Interagency Networks 
(Vehicles for change: Revamp the Agent Mentoring 
Program; Develop CT Mobile Education Teams; 
Create/Implement a Center for Lessons Learned, an 
Expert Registry, a CT Readiness Index and a CT 
Training Database) 
 
Table 3.   Four Actions Framework for Transforming Counterterrorism Training, 
Preserving Institutional Memory and Enhancing Knowledge Management 
STRATEGY CANVAS 
 
Figure 1.   Strategy Canvas for Transforming Counterterrorism Training, Preserving 
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Enhancing Regional and 
Interagency Networks 
 51
B. VALUE INNOVATION 
The value innovation is institutional change to more effectively meet the 
counterterrorism threat by exporting knowledge from experienced personnel to less 
experienced personnel. The vehicle for implementing this institutional change is revised 
counterterrorism training, specifically through streamlined knowledge transfer, creating 
value in training/exporting knowledge, and developing regional and interagency networks 
in order to raise the overall effectiveness of all counterterrorism personnel. Specific 
actions proposed in the four actions framework to further guide this strategic change are 
as follows: 1) Revamp the Agent Mentoring System; 2) Create/Implement CT Mobile 
Education Teams; 3) Create/Implement a Center for Lessons Learned; 4) 
Create/Implement an Expert Registry; 4) Create/Implement a CT Readiness Index; 5) 
Create/Implement a comprehensive Training Database to catalog CT training which, at a 
minimum, should be conducted quarterly. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN 
The environmental scan or “just one thing” related to the importance of this 
Strategy Canvas and Four Actions Framework centers around the critical need to raise the 
bar in knowledge management/transfer in the homeland security arena, particularly by 
leveraging knowledge of experienced personnel and creating mechanisms to infuse this 
knowledge effectively to less experienced personnel. 
As evidenced by the outcomes of numerous inquires and public opinion polls 
since 9/11, the American public expects the FBI to effectively execute its duties as a dual 
counterterrorism and domestic intelligence agency. Since 9/11, the FBI has taken 
substantial steps to meet the threat, to include the reassignment of hundreds of personnel 
to CT matters, hiring drives to employ personnel with critical skills, revising training 
curricula, etc. In the realm of counterterrorism training, however, the FBI has been only 
partially successful in providing necessary training to CT personnel. Due to its position as 
a lead counterterrorism agency and partner homeland security agency, it is critical that 
the FBI continue to adequately train FBI and liaison personnel with the necessary 
resources to accomplish the mission. Historically, numerous homeland security partners 
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have relied on revered FBI training programs to provide innovative training through such 
programs as the FBI National Academy or the Law Enforcement Executive Development 
System. Currently, the FBI is presented with a challenge and an opportunity to again lead 
the way in providing premiere, necessary and unparalleled training not only to its own 
personnel, but also to partners in this multi-agency, international War on Terror that 
requires joint effort.  
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CT KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER AND 
IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS 
Why is the development of an effective mechanism of counterterrorism 
knowledge transfer critical to homeland security efforts? Developing institutional change 
within the FBI to revise counterterrorism training effectively to transfer expertise from 
experienced CT personnel to less experienced personnel will raise core capabilities, both 
within the FBI and among partner agencies. With an enemy becoming more and more 
capable of causing catastrophic damage in this asymmetrical conflict, it is critical that 
proactive steps be taken by the FBI to quickly address the aforementioned gap. This 
proactive approach will better equip the U.S. homeland security community, beginning 
with the FBI, to more effectively meet and counter the terrorist threat.   
In building a newfound strategy to link the many facets of counterterrorism 
training, it is critical that there is substantial interface between all elements. For example, 
there has been limited interface between the SET and CEPDU, which provides room for 
enhancement in the future. Additionally, the recommendation of establishing CT Mobile 
Education Teams offers a mechanism through which MET members could spend three 
months building educational modules through liaison with such entities as the SET, 
CEPDU, Training Division, etc., prior to implementing tailored, yet flexible curricula to 
most effectively increase CT knowledge management in the FBI. As evidenced by the 
success of the FBI Counterterrorism Division Fly Team in terms of enhanced knowledge 
management (Note: team members do not serve as case agents while assigned to the 
team, allowing for substantial increases in deployment time, training time, and 
opportunities to transfer knowledge), the fact that MET members would also not be case  
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agents during their MET assignment, provides the same opportunities to focus upon the 
knowledge management mission from continuous development in the ever-changing 
arena, to implementation. 
Several mechanisms for creating and implementing Mobile Education Teams 
were considered. At the inception of this research, it was believed that the FBI Training 
Division, which offers exceptional training through New Agents’ Training, the National 
Academy (foreign and domestic law enforcement), and the Center for Intelligence 
Training (analysts). Interviews were conducted of Training Division instructors and 
curriculum development personnel. As delineated above, and reinforced by Dr. Deborah 
Beebe, Unit Chief of the Curriculum Development and Evaluation Unit, “our focus is on 
the National Academy, New Agents’ Training, and the Intelligence Career Service.”67 
There is no Career Path Unit or element thereof at the Training Division. While case 
studies and lessons learned are a small segment of the training provided to each of the 
three focal areas at the FBI Academy, there is no formal or comprehensive study of ways 
to improve knowledge transfer, specifically from experienced personnel to less 
experienced personnel.  
Counterterrorism-related in-services such as CT Stage II Academy and other 
topics are predominantly developed and operated by the operational Division, often with 
little input or oversight by the Training Division. However, the Training Division 
includes both personnel and tools that would be particularly helpful in the possible 
development of CT Mobile Education Teams. Concerning Training Division personnel, 
Instructor System Specialists assist in identifying instruction gaps, goals, and methods to 
teach to those gaps. As recommended by Unit Chief Deborah Beebe, the Instructor 
System Specialists could partake in a “Focus Group” comprised of the specialist and the 
Subject Matter Expert from the MET to delineate competencies, to identify gaps, and to 
develop learning objectives as well as content for the course. Following that collaborative 
effort, Instruction Designers develop course materials, lesson plans, activities, Power 
Point presentations, instructor and student guides, etc. They send drafts to the Subject 
                                                 
67 Deborah Beebe, FBI Training Division, Curriculum Development and Evaluation Unit, Interview, 
March 5, 2008. 
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Matter Experts to review and modify. As stated previously, one of the common 
roadblocks to effectively transferring knowledge is that it usurps the valuable time of 
busy experts. With the opportunity for Subject Matter Experts to collaborate with the 
aforementioned personnel to proactively and quickly delineate objectives and create 
course materials, METs could truly spend a fraction of their time fully developing 
curriculum, while devoting the majority of their time to additional methods, 
implementation, and to what actually works best, to include techniques such as 
storytelling.   
Concerning available tools to foster the forward movement of CT Mobile 
Education Teams, the technological advancement of CENTRA affords on-line, 
interactive and collaborative learning where course attendees can sit at their desks at 
Field Offices around the country, and with only a sound card and earphones, can partake 
in active on-line sessions. These sessions provide the capabilities to provide live lecture, 
view PowerPoint, conduct instant messaging, etc. Therefore, without agents, analysts and 
task force officers having to leave their offices, they can partake in collaborative, 
interactive learning environments that could be facilitated by members of the MET. 
While this would be one mechanism that could be immediately utilized by METs, it 
certainly should not be the only mechanism employed.  
So how would Mobile Education Teams be created and where would they be 
housed? It is proposed that the FBI conduct a Bureau-wide canvass for seasoned 
investigators who possess a myriad of CT and deployment experience to compete through 
the Career Board process for approximately 10 MET positions, in order to form two 
METs. These positions should be Term GS-14 Supervisory Special Agent and 
Intelligence Analyst positions, with a minimum assignment period of one year. The 
METs should not only operate within the Counterterrorism Division, but also co-located 
with the Counterterrorism Education and Professional Development Unit (CEPDU) at 
FBIHQ. 
Upon selection to the MET, the teams would work with CEPDU, the SET, 
Counterterrorism Division Executive Management, and Training Coordinators 
throughout the 56 FBI Field Offices to specifically identify, target and address training 
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and knowledge infusion gaps. Currently, since there is no central mechanism within the 
FBI with sufficient manpower to identify, address and fill such counterterrorism training 
gaps, the creation of METs would provide immediate benefit in fostering strategic change 
as the FBI continues to develop its CT work force. METs should be tasked with 
developing curricula to fill the aforementioned training and knowledge infusion gaps, not 
only by providing regional training sessions to FBI and interagency partners, but also by 
providing hands-on consultation with Case Agents and Intelligence Analysts in Field 
Offices, to share personal experience with these personnel to increase the fusion of tacit 
knowledge. By accomplishing these tasks, the FBI will make significant improvements in 
counterterrorism knowledge management. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. STRATEGY FOR TARGETING COUNTERTERRORISM TRAINING 
GAPS 
Considering the wide range of CT expertise developed by FBI personnel 
throughout the world, how does the FBI better utilize its vast expertise to prepare more 
adequately a larger percentage of its workforce to address the threat? As terrorists 
continue to train daily to bring catastrophic harm to United States citizens and interests 
worldwide, the FBI can no longer afford to be plagued by “recreating the wheel.” The 
FBI must devise and implement a strategic plan to enhance and maximize the CT 
training, while directly enhancing the mechanisms for effective knowledge transfer 
among personnel. While the FBI has made substantial steps in making necessary changes 
in line with its primary counterterrorism mission post 9/11, while also developing several 
building blocks to drive further change, additional room for continued improvement 
exists. By combining the following recommendations and implementation suggestions, 
the FBI would quickly address a significant number of its CT training gaps. 
• Recommendation: Place renewed emphasis on training, spreading the 
message through a widespread publicity campaign from the highest levels 
of the FBI down through the ranks to the newest personnel. The negative 
mindset that exists toward training must be acknowledged and dismantled 
at all levels. The intangible, long-term benefits of training combined with 
a more effective knowledge management scheme must be emphasized as 
much as the tangible statistics inherent in case work such as arrests, 
convictions, etc. In essence, raising the bar of all personnel through 
training and knowledge transfer will streamline efforts and will result in 
increased benefits within case work, effectively enhancing the ability of 
the FBI to meet its number one priority of preventing terrorism. 
Implementation: CEPDU, with the assistance of the Training Division and 
proposed Mobile Education Teams, should continue to increase the 
number of training opportunities available to CT personnel. Regarding the 
overall mindset toward training, it is vital that the critical importance of 





FBI. Communication of the leader’s change message “must be relentless,” 
not to persuade people. . .but because “stopping [the message] could be 
interpreted as the end of the executive’s commitment.”68  
• Recommendation: Lessen the burden placed on managers and agent 
personnel alike by enhancing the administrative support within the CT 
arena. A substantial increase in administrative support would allow 
supervisors, agents and analysts to devote full attention to the elements of 
their job descriptions, rather than also being burdened by administrative 
functions that usurp precious time. Many Counterterrorism Division 
employees assert that approximately 20% or more of their time is devoted 
to critical administrative duties that could be accomplished by 
administrative support personnel. If this administrative burden were 
lessened, it would open a substantial portion of time for training, career 
development, and knowledge transfer at no expense to operational tempo 
since it is already negatively affected by these administrative duties. 
Implementation: It is critical that the FBI effectively leverage all 
applicable entities, including Congress, to ensure funding for significant 
increases in administrative support within the CT arena. Current 
administrative support within the CT arena is woefully inadequate. 
• Recommendation: Drive people out of their comfort zones, by 
emphasizing the importance of each and every employee sharing their 
knowledge and expertise in order to not only streamline our efforts, but 
also to ensure that the FBI continues to grow into a true and dynamic 
‘learning organization’. 
Implementation: Driving people out of their comfort zones requires not 
only a change in the expectations placed on FBI personnel, but also a 
change in mindset of many personnel. In some instances, personnel are 
less apt to change or question current operations, perhaps due largely to 
the fact that within the CT arena, there is little, if any, room for 
experimentation and failure. “In government, the environment punishes 
error more than it rewards excellence, encouraging bureaucracy because it 
makes it easier to avoid error and to have an excuse when error occurs.”69 
As a result, it is critical that the FBI promote creativity, innovation, and 
substantial improvements in knowledge management.  
• Recommendation: Develop and disseminate the ‘story’ that great change 
has been accomplished and continues for the right reasons. 
Implementation: The practice of storytelling remains an important 
mechanism through which knowledge and insight are transferred. 
Similarly, storytelling remains a vital tool in leading personnel because it 
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allows personnel to gain insight into the personal experiences of their 
leaders. Storytelling should become an integral part of CT training within 
the FBI. The training coordinators within each Field Office, in 
combination with the Training Division, CEPDU and METs should ensure 
the inclusion of this tool in training offered within Field Divisions as well 
as at the FBI Academy. 
• Recommendation: Capitalize on the most viable ready reserve of highly 
trained CT personnel, specifically the Fly Team, and facilitate their 
transfer to numerous Field Offices throughout the FBI upon completion of 
three years of service to the Fly Team. Currently Fly Team Special Agent 
personnel departing the Counterterrorism Division have only one transfer 
option, to Washington Field Office, where robust Extraterritorial Squads 
and Rapid Deployment Teams already possess a variety of specialized CT 
experience. Instead, Fly Team personnel should be transferred to a wide 
variety of Field Offices where, as senior agents with extensive training and 
deployment experience, they can infuse knowledge to less experienced CT 
personnel. 
Implementation:  While the Human Resources Division approved the 
proposal to allow Fly Team personnel to transfer to a range of FBI offices 
after three years of service to the team, funding for the implementation of 
this option is not available until 2011. The utilization of other sources of 
funding would allow the immediate implementation of this program. 
Recommendation: Develop an Expert Registry–this registry should 
include up-to-date information regarding the comprehensive experience of 
personnel, to include investigations worked, specialized skills, as well as 
travel and training completed. 
Implementation: CEPDU, in coordination with the Training Coordinators 
in each Field Office, should develop and implement one comprehensive 
Expert Registry that will provide the most up-to-date information 
regarding the experiences, training, and qualifications of CT personnel.  In 
February 2009, the Human Resources Branch/Career Path Unit launched a 
Web-based site called Manage Your Career (MY Career), which has the 
potential to serve as the foundation for this Expert Registry.  Currently a 
developmental tool, which allows employees to manage their career 
development, MY Career, allows employees to develop an Individual 
Development Plan based on competencies to guide the employee from 
novice to expert in a given field.  Similarly, MY Career, if fully developed 
and utilized among FBI personnel, would allow FBI Executive 
Management to identify unique or specialized skills rapidly or to identify 
training gaps that could be addressed by such entities as Mobile Education 
Teams.   
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• Recommendation: Develop a comprehensive CT Training and Tracking 
System–this system would be an important enhancement to the Expert 
Registry in that it would identify the training of CT personnel, existing 
gaps and needs for refresher/recertification training, etc. As a result, there 
would be one mechanism for tracking and ensuring that personnel are 
being provided the breadth of training they truly need to operate in a 
variety of worldwide arenas while pursuing terrorism subjects. In the 
constantly evolving CT arena, it is not impractical to idealize the creation 
of a system in which personnel working CT matters obtain relevant 
training, whether Web-based, in-service, through lecture, advanced study, 
or other methods, on a quarterly basis, as outlined in further detail below. 
Implementation:  CEPDU, in coordination with Training Coordinators in 
each Field Office, should develop and implement one comprehensive CT 
Training and Tracking System to identify and quickly address gaps in CT 
training.  The recently launched MY Career software tool has the potential 
to become this training/tracking system by incorporating data that is 
currently disparate or incomplete in the Bureau Personnel Management 
System (BPMS) and Virtual Academy training records.   
• Recommendation: Implement a CT Readiness Index–This project had 
been led and directed by Associate Executive Assistant Director T.J. 
Harrington as part of a measurement framework for the CT Career Path. 
The implementation of this index, in combination with an Expert Registry 
and an overall repository of training received and deployment experience 
completed by CT personnel, will provide the strategic framework to truly 
delineate the strengths and weaknesses of personnel, while providing a 
baseline of measurement for continued change. 
Implementation: CEPDU, in coordination with Training Coordinators in 
each Field Office and the Career Path Unit should further develop and 
utilize MY Career as a CT Readiness Index. Updates for the Readiness 
Index should be made by Training Coordinators on a monthly basis, 
ensuring the timely entry of information into the index. 
• Recommendation: Revise the Training Agent/Mentoring program–The 
two-year Probationary Agent period, which dictates a wide variety of 
experiences and requirements to be met by the probationary agent with the 
guidance of a Training Agent/Mentor, provides a broad foundation for 
further development as an investigator. While a Probationary Agent is 
capable of gaining these experiences and meeting these requirements 
without the assistance of an effective Training Agent/Mentor, why not 
ensure that the Training Agents/Mentors uphold the highest standards of 
developing and supporting these new personnel? In reality, mentoring is 
equated to apprentice schemes, “which evolved to transfer tacit knowledge 




effective than manuals and computer based training, but they are also one 
of the only ways of embedding and validating knowledge transfer between 
humans.”70 
Currently the FBI Career Path Unit is considering methods to improve and 
standardize this program. One recommendation for consideration would 
involve utilizing the recommended CT Mobile Education Teams to 
develop and focus a block of instruction for Training Agents tasked with 
mentoring new Agents assigned to the CT Career Path. 
Implementation:  The Human Resources Branch, Career Path Unit, 
maintains oversight and responsibility for the Probationary Agent and 
Training Agent programs. By leveraging METs to provide CT training to 
Training Agents, the FBI would implement a new mechanism to promote 
at least a minimum baseline for training within the CT realm. 
• Recommendation: Utilize the Field Office Training Coordinator Program 
as a mechanism to promote an enhanced Training Agent/Mentoring 
program, as well as a forum for promoting the use of Mobile Education 
Teams regionally. 
Implementation: Fully leverage Training Coordinators to create 
consistency in CT training and mentoring within each Field Office. 
• Recommendation: Establish quarterly CT training–The establishment of 
an Expert Registry, Training and Tracking Database, and CT Readiness 
Index, which are intended to be addressed through the further 
development of the MY Career site, will provide the foundation for 
understanding strengths and weaknesses within the FBI regarding CT 
training and knowledge management. Through this, a rigorous and 
comprehensive training regimen should be established to allow personnel 
to engage in training/knowledge transfer on at least a quarterly basis. The 
development of Mobile Education Teams as outlined below may provide 
one mechanism of supporting the quarterly training goal. By building 
small, but frequent, training blocks, investigations are disrupted less than 
by longer, less frequent blocks. 
Implementation:  CEPDU, in concert with the Training Division and 
Human Resources Branch/Career Path Unit, should develop ample 
training opportunities to allow for quarterly training of personnel. 
• Recommendation: Create a Web-based Center for Lessons Learned, which 
will become the FBI Center for Lessons Learned–As delineated and 
developed by the Offices of the Chief Knowledge Officer and the Chief 
Information Officer, the FBI has initiated the implementation of tools such 
as SharePoint to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned, identification of 
gaps, and networking of personnel. As these elements are further 
                                                 
70 Snowden, “Just in Time KM–Conceptual Roots and Pragmatic Interventions,” 6. 
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developed, however, it becomes important for users to be fully cognizant 
of the fact that “best practices are past practices” and may not provide the 
most prudent path for current practices in the dynamic counterterrorism 
arena. Therefore, while this Web-based Center for Lessons Learned 
through SharePoint as well as future mechanisms offer tremendous 
opportunities, they should be further supported by the additional, critical 
facets of knowledge management that are outlined within other sectors of 
these recommendations.  
Implementation: Office of the Chief Knowledge Officer and Office of the 
Chief Information Officer, in concert with the Counterterrorism Division, 
should ensure the development and refinement of an FBI Center for 
Lessons Learned, to include full staffing of the requisite Collection Teams, 
as well as training to ensure optimal employment of this important tool. 
• Recommendation: Spread expertise to Field Offices through the 
development of Mobile Education Teams comprised of personnel who 
have completed assignments to the Fly Team, Extraterritorial Squads, 
Legal Attaches, etc., as well as retirees with broad experience to share. 
Foster an environment whereby these teams may work within the cynefin 
network, allowing patterns and gaps to emerge, rather than often being 
predicted and dictated. While atypical in the field of government 
operations, this cynefin network provides a foundation that accommodates 
the ever-changing and unpredictable nature of counterterrorism work. By 
allowing MET personnel to utilize the chaotic and complicated realms as 
means to address needs as they arise would provide increased opportunity 
for the rapid identification of gaps, and the development of programs to 
address those gaps. 
Implementation: Within the Counterterrorism Division, establish two 
Mobile Education Teams comprised of ten persons who serve as Term 
Supervisory Special Agents and  Intelligence Analysts. 
• Recommendation: Spread organizational understanding of and, where 
possible, link the strategic missions, messages, services and products of 
such entities as CEPDU, SET and METs, as well as the Special Agent 
Advisory Committee, Counterterrorism Division Assistant Director’s 
Advisory Committee, etc. 
Implementation: The Program Management Office of the Strategic 
Execution Team is already geared toward the alignment of initiatives, 
processes and priorities in order to reach the goals of the SET. By 
increasing the number of personnel assigned to the Program Management 
Office of the SET, the missions, messages, services, and products of the 




• Recommendation: Link training received and shared to performance 
appraisals. While knowledge management is part of FBI performance 
appraisals, under the critical element of Acquiring, Applying and Sharing 
Job Knowledge, the appraisals are not directly tied to promotion and 
recognition. By linking training received and applied, as well teaching of 
lessons learned to the performance evaluations of personnel, substantial 
growth measures will occur, thereby fostering ‘buy in’ by a larger 
percentage of personnel. A similar recommendation, to align performance 
appraisals with Department of Justice and Intelligence Community 
Standards is recommended in the February 5, 2008 Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Director’s Strategic Execution Team Briefing for ODNI 
Staff.71 
Implementation: Human Resources Branch and Counterterrorism Division 
Strategic Execution Team, in concert with Office of General Counsel and 
Industrial Psychology reviews for validation as a legally defensible 
criterion of performance measure. 
• Recommendation: Develop a mechanism to review, assess and, where 
appropriate, implement strategic recommendations that emanate from the 
studies of personnel in advanced degree programs.  
Implementation: The Continuing Education and Professional Development 
Unit (CEPDU) within the FBI Counterterrorism Division may be a viable 
option. 
• Recommendation: Create a unit within the Counterterrorism Division to 
develop and guide the implementation of the Mobile Education Teams and 
to assist in the development of the other proposed recommendations. 
Implementation: This new unit should house the recommended Mobile 
Education Teams, which, in concert with the Counterterrorism Division 
CEPDU, and the Human Resources Branch Career Path Unit, should 
continue the development, coordination, and implementation of viable 
recommendations for change. 
• Recommendation: Ensure utilization of the principles of Kelman, 
specifically leveraging those that are ideologically discontent with the 
traditional system, exposing them to early wins from the 
development/implementation of knowledge transfer mechanisms, and 
utilizing the positive feedback to activate the discontented.  
Implementation: For each unit playing a role in the implementation of the 
aforementioned recommendations, utilize Kelman’s principles to leverage 
and increase support as well as success.  
                                                 
71 Harrington, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director’s Strategic Execution Team Briefing for 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Staff, 9. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
As astutely recommended by the 9/11 Commission, 
A specialized and integrated national security workforce should be 
established at the FBI consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and 
surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, rewarded, and retained 
to ensure the development of an institutional culture imbued with a deep 
expertise in intelligence and national security.72 
It is the aforementioned institutional culture with deep expertise that begs to be 
fully exploited through the significant overhaul of the FBI CT training program.  
Implementation of the recommended elements of the delineated training strategy 
would ensure that FBI personnel and partner Task Force Officers working CT matters 
receive necessary training, while also guaranteeing that the expertise held by a finite 
number of individuals is more adequately exported. Perhaps more importantly, the 
execution of this strategy would maximize learning by simultaneously promoting self-
paced training in combination with classroom instruction, regardless of whether the 
student is a probationary agent or a CT veteran. By implementing one recommendation, 
alone, specifically the development and implementation of CT Mobile Education Teams 
comprised of seasoned CT investigators who are empowered to utilize a broad range of 
knowledge management tools to identify and address CT knowledge gaps, would ensure 
significant improvements in the infusion of CT knowledge among FBI personnel. 
Historically, the FBI has risen to meet evolving challenges, most recently by 
further developing itself as a dual law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency. 
Transforming CT training and enhancing knowledge transfer within the FBI is vital not 
only in achieving our critical, dual mission, but also in maximizing our preparedness to 
counter the threat.  
                                                 
72 9/11 Commission Report, 425-426. 
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